Information, (Perceived) Admission Chances and Preference Reporting under Deferred Acceptance. An Experimental Study

How to cite

Keller, Tamas; Kiss, Hubert János; Pintér, Ágnes. 2026. "Information, (Perceived) Admission Chances and Preference Reporting under Deferred Acceptance. An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018245. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18245-1.1

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Tamas Keller* , Hubert János Kiss , Ágnes Pintér

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018245
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18245-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-03-31 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18245

Abstract

We study how different types of information about relative priority shape preference reporting under the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, focusing on whether information affects participants’ beliefs about their admission chances and, in turn, their reporting behavior. To address this question, we implement a laboratory school choice experiment in which four students compete for four schools, each with a capacity of one seat. Students have strict preferences over schools: they earn 15 EUR for their top choice, 11 EUR for their second choice, 8 EUR for their third choice, and 4 EUR for their least preferred choice. Schools rank students based on randomly assigned admission scores that determine priority.
In each round, participants first submit an initial rank-order list (ROL), then receive treatment-specific information, and finally submit a revised, payoff-relevant ROL. Each session is assigned to one of six treatment cells in a 3 × 2 design that crosses three information environments with two competition regimes. The information treatments are: (1) admission score disclosure, where participants observe all group members’ admission scores; (2) historical cutoff information, where participants observe the previous round’s minimum score required for admission to their highest-paying school; and (3) potential acceptance, where participants receive an individualized signal indicating whether they would be admitted to their highest-paying school if they ranked it first, holding others’ initial ROLs fixed. The competition regimes vary in the number of students competing for the same highest-paying school. In the full-competition regime, all four students share the same highest-paying school. In the medium-competition regime, two students compete for one of the highest-paying schools, and the other two compete for another.
Our main behavioral outcome is top-choice reporting, defined as ranking the highest-paying school first.
The experiment is conducted at the Laboratorio de Economía Experimental (LEE) at the University Jaume I in Castellón, Spain, in six sessions with 80 participants each. Each participant makes eight decisions, yielding 3,840 observations.

Intervention

Each session is assigned to one of six treatment cells in a 3 × 2 design that crosses three information environments with two competition regimes. The information treatments are: (1) admission score disclosure, where participants observe all group members’ admission scores; (2) historical cutoff information, where participants observe the previous round’s minimum score required for admission to their highest-paying school; and (3) potential acceptance, where participants receive an individualized signal indicating whether they would be admitted to their highest-paying school if they ranked it first, holding others’ initial ROLs fixed. The competition regimes vary in the number of students competing for the same highest-paying school. In the full-competition regime, all four students share the same highest-paying school. In the medium-competition regime, two students compete for one of the highest-paying schools, and the other two compete for another.

Experimental design

We implement a laboratory school choice experiment in which four students compete for four schools, each with a capacity of one seat. Students have strict preferences over schools: they earn 15 EUR for their top choice, 11 EUR for their second choice, 8 EUR for their third choice, and 4 EUR for their least preferred choice. Schools rank students based on randomly assigned admission scores that determine priority.
In each round, participants first submit an initial rank-order list (ROL), then receive treatment-specific information, and finally submit a revised, payoff-relevant ROL.

Design details

Randomization method
Interventions are assigned randomly based on the value of a randomly generated number.
Randomization unit
Individual: Participants are randomly assigned at the session level. Each session corresponds to exactly one information treatment × one competition regime.
Clusters
480 students
Observations
Six sessions with 80 participants each. Each participant makes eight decisions, yielding a total of 3,840 observations
Arms
80 students in each of the six combinations of information treatment (n = 3) × competition regime (n = 2)
Primary outcomes
Our main behavioral outcome is top-choice reporting, defined as ranking the highest-paying school first.

Cited by

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Keywords