The Price of Asking: Social Frictions in Relational Lending and FinTech Adoption
How to cite
XU, Yuchen; Sun, Yuchen; Naso, Pedro; Wang, Mengye. 2026. "The Price of Asking: Social Frictions in Relational Lending and FinTech Adoption." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018242. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18242-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Access to credit is a central determinant of household welfare in low-income settings. Relational lending has been a main source of credit, but it is not socially costless. Borrowing from a friend or neighbor requires asking, negotiating, and potentially damaging the relationship if repayment becomes difficult. This paper uses a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Burundi to study two such frictions: the mental cost of asking and reputational concern. We recruit real borrower-lender pairs and allow borrowers to finance repeated investment opportunities either through their peer lender or through a simulated FinTech application with fixed, anonymous terms. By exogenously varying the FinApp interest rate, we identify how borrowers’ credit-channel choices respond to the price of anonymous borrowing and recover the implied interest-rate premium associated with avoiding social frictions. We further vary network tie strength and project default risk to isolate the two underlying mechanisms. The design also allows us to study whether anonymous credit crowds out or complements relational lending and whether it improves borrower welfare.
Intervention
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Burundi to study the social frictions embedded in relational lending. We recruit real borrower-lender pairs drawn from existing social networks and embed them in a five-round loan game with real-value incentives. Borrowers face repeated risky agricultural investment opportunities and may finance investment either through their peer lender (via WhatsApp negotiation) or through a simulated anonymous FinTech application (FinApp) with fixed, non-negotiable terms and no interpersonal interaction. We vary three treatment dimensions: (1) the FinApp interest rate (3%, 5%, 8%, 10%, or 15%), which serves as the main price shifter for anonymous credit; (2) the strength of the borrower’s network tie to the peer lender (close tie versus less-close tie), which shifts the mental cost of asking; and (3) whether the assigned investment project places the borrower in an environment with default risk (PD) or not (PN), which shifts reputational concern. Extension arms include a relational-credit-only arm, a FinApp-only arm, a risk-matched no-default-risk project (PN1), and a no-renegotiation arm.
Experimental design
The primary experiment employs a 5×2×2 factorial design crossing FinApp interest rate (3%, 5%, 8%, 10%, 15%), network tie strength (close tie versus less-close tie), and investment project risk (default risk versus no default risk), yielding 20 cells. Borrower-lender pairs are recruited from real social networks identified in a baseline survey. In each session, borrowers and lenders are seated in separate rooms and communicate via WhatsApp for loan negotiations. Borrowers choose each round whether to borrow from the peer lender, from FinApp, or not at all. Four extension arms (relational-credit-only, FinApp-only, a risk-matched no-default-risk project, and a no-renegotiation arm) are implemented at the two benchmark FinApp rates of 5% and 10%. Final token balances determine real compensation.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.