Approximate Common Beliefs in Rationality in Dynamic Games
How to cite
Garcia-Galocha, Aleix; Kovarik, Jaromir; Zuazo-Garin, Peio. 2026. "Approximate Common Beliefs in Rationality in Dynamic Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018188. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18188-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This laboratory experiment investigates the empirical robustness of dynamic solution concepts when the assumption of common belief in rationality is relaxed. Using the framework of Approximate Common Beliefs in Rationality (ACBR), we test the result that we establish a theoretical equivalence between static rationalizability and dynamic p-rationalizability, regardless how dynamic rationality is defined. This implies that even the slightest doubt about others' rationality (p<1) renders dynamic reasoning essentially static.
We implement a within-subject design using a battery of games where Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPNE) and our concept of Approximate Equilibrium provide diverging predictions. Specifically, we introduce a version of the game in Figure 4 of Reny (1992), where these two solution concepts differ entirely. This allows us to identify whether subjects' behavior follows dynamic refinements (Forward or Backward Induction) or follows our refinement of Approximate Equilibrium.
By testing subjects across multiple games, we examine if the empirical failure of induction is driven by this predicted collapse of dynamic reasoning. Additionally, we elicit participants' beliefs to verify if observed choices are consistent with the approximate belief in rationality framework.
Intervention
Participants will play a series dynamic games. The study uses a within-subject design where each participant plays a set of two-player games, including a Centipede game, Battle of the Sexes with an outside option and a modified version of the game in Figure 4 on Reny 1992 with the same structure as the Battle of the Sexes with an outside option. The experiment is designed to compare behavior under classic dynamic refinements (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium) versus the predictions of Approximate Equilibrium. In addition to making choices, participants will be asked to report their beliefs about other players' actions, which will be incentivized using a scoring rule. To control for potential confounding factors, we randomize role assignment as well as game order. All interactions are one-shot to avoid repeated-game effects.
Experimental design
-- Study Overview and Subject Pool
This laboratory experiment investigates strategic decision-making and belief formation in sequential environments. We plan to recruit via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) between 80 and 100 participants. The experiment is programmed and conducted using oTree (Chen et al., 2016).
-- Experimental Tasks
The session consists of 12 rounds of extensive-form games and 7 belief elicitation tasks. The set of games is:
I. One version of the Centipede game with length n=3 and where we elicit strategies with the strategic (cold) method.
II. The two BoS with outside option from Cooper et al. (1993).
III. A Decoy game (with the same structure as the BoS with outside option) with an obvious dominant strategy for both players.
IV. Two modified version of Figure 4 in Reny (1992) (also with the same structure as the BoS with outside option) where SPNE and AE predictions are mutually exclusive.
Subjects are matched in pairs that change for every game (stranger matching) to maintain the one-shot nature of the interactions.
-- Randomization
To control for order effects and learning, we implement a constrained randomization across four pre-defined sequences of play. Participants are randomly assigned to one of these four orders. The sequences are designed following two strict criteria:
I. Participants never play the same game (in different roles) in two consecutive rounds to minimize anchoring and immediate reciprocity effects.
II. All sequences begin with one game designed to test AE vs. SPNE, with the participant in the role of Player 1. This ensures that the primary strategic choice is elicited in a "clean" environment, uncontaminated by learning within the session.
-- Belief Elicitation
Following the decisions, we elicit subjective beliefs using a discretized Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR). Participants allocate 10 tokens (10% increments) across the opponent’s strategy space. The payoff function is strictly concave, with a maximum reward of €2.00 per task, ensuring incentive compatibility for risk-neutral and risk-averse agents.
-- Payment Protocol
To mitigate wealth effects and hedging, we use a Random Incentive System (RIS). Only 2 out of the 12 game rounds and 2 out of the 7 belief tasks are randomly selected for payment at the end of the session. Additionally, there is a fixed show-up fee of 3 Euros.
Design details
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