Designing Incentives to Combat Urban Diabetes in India

How to cite

Dizon-Ross, Rebecca; Aggarwal, Shilpa; Zucker, Ariel. 2017. "Designing Incentives to Combat Urban Diabetes in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001818. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1818-1.5

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Rebecca Dizon-Ross* , Shilpa Aggarwal , Ariel Zucker

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001818
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1818-1.5
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-01-02 – 2018-01-31
Countries
India (Tamil Nadu)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1818

Abstract

Diabetes and diabetes-related complications have reached epidemic levels in urban India. A promising strategy for local governments to reduce the financial and physical burdens of diabetes is to encourage better disease management by patients. Disease management may be particularly poor among impatient and present-biased people, since the costs of management (e.g., exercising more) are borne today but the benefits are realized in the future. Thus, offering financial rewards for healthy behaviors may be a potent tool for improving disease management. However, it is not well understood how to optimally design incentives for impatient and present-biased agents. Two key aspects of the incentive design--the lag between incentivized behavior and payment, and whether the contract is additively separable across days--should theoretically interact with time preferences. Based on these interactions, we have developed new insights for how to structure contracts to overcome the behavioral biases preventing healthy behaviors. This project will conduct a randomized evaluation of different incentive schemes for diabetics, varying lag length and additive separability, to evaluate what incentive scheme works best and how incentive effectiveness varies by individual time preferences. We will measure impacts on health outcomes including blood sugar control and exercise, as well as the medium-term persistence of these impacts.

Intervention

The experimental sample will first be randomly divided into three main groups: Control, Incentives and Monitoring-only. The Incentives group will have their behavior monitored daily and receive incentives (in the form of cell phone recharges) based on their performance. The Monitoring-only arm will have daily monitoring but no incentives, which will allow us to isolate the effect of incentives.

Within the Monitoring-only and Incentives groups, individuals will receive pedometers that will measure the number of steps they walk every day, and will be given a step target of 10,000 steps per day. The Incentives arm for each of these groups will receive incentives based on whether or not they meet the step target. Both Monitoring-only and Incentives groups report their daily measurements using an automated toll-free phone system, and receive feedback by SMS based on whether they reach their target.

The structure of the incentive contract offered within the Incentives arm will be randomly assigned to one of three sub-treatments, meant to test time-preference: 0-lag delivery (daily payment), medium-lag delivery (weekly, i.e., participants receive payments once a week for that week's behavior), and long-lag delivery (every four weeks, or "monthly"). This design allows for identification of the effect of payment lags on behavior through both intra-arm comparisons (e.g., within the weekly delivery treatment, the lags change as patients approach the incentive delivery date) and cross-arm comparisons. To test the predictions about additive separability, the medium-lag subtreatment will be further divided into three subgroups: two with "threshold" contracts which require participants to meet goals on a threshold number of days in a week in order to receive payment, and one with an additively separable "nonthreshold" contract. To benchmark the impacts of incentive design with the impact of incentive amount, some of the participants with the weekly nonthreshold contract will be randomly assigned to receive smaller incentive amounts.

In order to benchmark the impact of incentives with a common intervention to encourage lifestyle modification among high-risk populations, we cross-randomize 10% of the experimental sample to receive informational SMS messages about the prevention, management, and potential consequences of NCDs.

Experimental design

In this study, we propose to evaluate the efficacy of short run financial incentives designed to motivate diabetics and pre-diabetics to modify their lifestyles. Rewarding people for healthy behavior has been shown to markedly improve many types of health behaviors in both poor, but the use of incentives in combatting chronic disease has been limited to date. Whether such programs can effectively mitigate the particular challenges of urban diabetes remains an open question. The proposed research thus aims to address two research questions: First, can incentives cost-effectively promote lifestyle change among diabetics in urban India? Second, how can we optimize incentive design to account for diabetics' discount rates? We will answer these questions via a RCT evaluating several variants of a novel incentive program targeted to the needs of urban diabetics.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is stratified based on baseline Hba1c cut-off of 8%, and the answer to an initial survey question on "impatience". Ordered treatment assignment lists for each stratum cell are randomly generated in the office by a computer using Stata, and treatments are assigned to participants on rolling basis.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
3100 diabetics and pre-diabetics
Observations
3100 diabetics and pre-diabetics
Arms
The following treatment group distribution is approximate, since enrollees will be assigned to treatments according to baseline strata in a pre-determined order: Incentive Groups: T1 - Weekly Nonthreshold: 28% T2 - Weekly Threshold 1: 25% T3 - Weekly Threshold 2: 10% T4 - Monthly Nonthreshold: 5% T5 - Daily Nonthreshold: 5% T6 - Small Payment: 2% Non-incentive Groups: Monitoring Only: 6% "Pure" Control: 19% 10% of the experimental sample will be cross-randomized into the "SMS" treatment
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcome for measuring the health outcomes of incentives is Hba1c; secondary health outcomes include BMI, Blood pressure, a fitness assessment score, and a mental health score. Our primary outcome for evaluating the impact of the incentive design (i.e., for comparing incentive sub-treatments) will be exercise, measured as the percent of days on which the participant met his or her step target. Our secondary exercise outcomes include the average number of steps taken per day as measured by Fitbit records, and self-reported exercise.

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Keywords