Disentangling Device and Observability Effects in Dishonesty: Evidence from Probability-Equivalent Randomization Tasks

How to cite

Pintér, Ágnes; Priego, Nuria Rodríguez. 2026. "Disentangling Device and Observability Effects in Dishonesty: Evidence from Probability-Equivalent Randomization Tasks." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018177. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18177-1.0

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Ágnes Pintér* , Nuria Rodríguez Priego

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018177
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18177-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-03-30 – 2026-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18177

Abstract

This project studies dishonest behavior in environments in which individuals privately observe outcomes from randomization devices and self-report them for monetary gain. We design a set of eight treatments that isolate the causal effect of the structure and representation of randomization devices by equalizing outcome probabilities and payoff distributions across mechanisms. The treatment variations include comparisons between binary and multi-outcome devices, simple and cognitively complex randomization procedures, and physical or digital formats. In addition, the design incorporates treatments that vary the observability of outcomes, allowing for both aggregate inference of dishonesty and direct observation of individual misreporting.

The study examines how these features affect the level and structure of dishonest reporting. Beyond standard distributional measures, we leverage treatments with observable outcomes to characterize heterogeneity in reporting behavior and classify individuals into behavioral types. The project contributes to the literature by disentangling device effects from incentives and by linking aggregate evidence on dishonesty to underlying individual-level strategies.

Intervention

The study consists of a series of incentivized laboratory experiments in which participants observe realizations from randomization devices and report the outcome for monetary compensation. The objective is to study how the structure and implementation of the randomization device affect dishonest reporting, holding constant the probability distribution of outcomes and the associated payoffs.

Participants are assigned to one of several experimental conditions that vary along three main dimensions. First, we compare binary and multi-outcome environments by implementing coin-based and die-based tasks with equivalent winning probabilities. Second, we vary the cognitive complexity of the randomization process by contrasting simple devices with composite mechanisms that generate identical distributions through sequential steps. Third, we manipulate the format of the randomization device. The latter distinguishes between conditions in which participants generate outcomes themselves (e.g., by flipping a coin or rolling a die) and conditions in which outcomes are generated by the computer within the experimental software.

When outcomes are generated by the participant, only reported values are observed, and dishonesty can be inferred only from aggregate deviations from the theoretical distribution. When outcomes are generated by the computer, the realization is recorded by the software, allowing the researcher to compare realized and reported outcomes at the individual level. Although all decisions remain anonymous and unsupervised, the computer-generated implementation may affect participants’ perception of privacy.

Each participant completes multiple independent rounds of the task within a single session, and monetary payoffs depend on reported outcomes. The design does not involve deception and maintains identical incentives across comparable treatments.

Experimental design

The study employs a between-subjects experimental design in which participants are randomly assigned to one of eight treatments. Each participant takes part in a single experimental session and is exposed to only one treatment condition. Within each session, participants complete five independent repetitions of a reporting task in which they observe the realization of a randomization device and report the outcome for monetary compensation.

The treatments vary along two key dimensions. The first dimension concerns the structure of the randomization device. Participants are assigned either to binary-outcome tasks or to multi-outcome tasks, and within each category, the randomization process is implemented either through a simple device or through a sequential composite mechanism that generates an equivalent probability distribution. The second dimension concerns the mode of implementation of the randomization device. In some treatments, the outcome is generated by the participant using a physical device (such as a coin or die), while in others the outcome is generated by the experimental software (z-Tree).

In all treatments, the probability distribution of outcomes and the associated payoff structure are held constant across comparable conditions. This ensures that any differences in reporting behavior can be attributed to the structure or implementation of the randomization device rather than to differences in expected monetary incentives.

Participants receive monetary payoffs based on their reported outcomes in one randomly selected round. The experimental design does not involve deception, and all decisions are made anonymously and without direct supervision by the experimenter.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants are randomly assigned to treatments through a computerized randomization process that ensures that each participant has an equal probability of being allocated to any of the treatment conditions. Randomization is performed independently for each participant and does not depend on participant characteristics or on the behavior of other participants.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the individual participant. Each participant is assigned to exactly one treatment and remains in that treatment throughout the session.
Clusters
480 participants
Observations
Each of the 480 participants completes five independent rounds of the reporting task, resulting in a total of 2,400 observations at the decision level.
Arms
The sample is evenly distributed across the eight treatments, with 60 participants assigned to each treatment condition. Since each participant completes five rounds, each treatment yields 300 observations at the decision level.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcomes are the reported outcome in each round. At the aggregate level, we analyze mean reported values and distributional deviations. In treatments with observable outcomes, we additionally construct individual-level measures of misreporting, including indicators for any misreporting, upward misreporting, and maximal misreporting.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include measures related to the cognitive and individual correlates of reporting behavior. These comprise response times during the reporting decision, individual characteristics such as gender, measures of cognitive ability, and survey-based measures capturing moral attitudes, risk preferences, and background characteristics (including field of study and demographics).

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Keywords