Exit and Voice under Different Institutional Frames: Evidence from Job-Search and Collective Bargaining Survey Experiments
How to cite
Jorck, Gerrit von; Börger, Tobias; Meyerhoff, Jürgen. 2026. "Exit and Voice under Different Institutional Frames: Evidence from Job-Search and Collective Bargaining Survey Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018142. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18142-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study pursues both empirical and methodological objectives. On the empirical side, it builds on Hirschman’s (1970) exit–voice framework to examine how employed individuals evaluate core employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into two distinct responses to dissatisfaction: exit, defined as willingness to change positions, and voice, defined as willingness to participate in industrial action. The design allows the analysis to move beyond preference measurement by linking workers’ evaluations of job attributes to behavioural intentions across different institutional contexts.
On the methodological side, the study contributes to the labour-economics literature on wage–amenity trade-offs and institutional framing in stated-preference experiments, where most preference-elicitation experiments frame employment decisions as choices between job advertisements. The present design contrasts this conventional job-search framing with an alternative collective bargaining framing that presents employment conditions as negotiated tariff outcomes, while holding all employment attributes constant. This comparison allows us to assess whether institutional framing systematically affects estimated preferences and the interpretation of wage–amenity trade-offs.
Across both treatments, employment packages vary along four attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees. Attribute levels are expressed as deviations from respondents’ current employment situation and reflect magnitudes commonly observed in job changes and collective bargaining agreements. Using a common attribute framework ensures comparability across all experimental modules.
Analytically, the study consists of three complementary experiments with distinct objectives. Experiment 1 employs a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to identify framing effects on preferences by comparing income-equivalent valuations of employment attributes across the job-search and tariff treatment. Rather than directly contrasting raw coefficient estimates, the analysis focuses on marginal rates of substitution between non-wage attributes and income, derived under a linear income specification, thereby allowing meaningful comparison of wage–amenity trade-offs across institutional contexts. Experiment 2 uses a factorial survey experiment (FSE) in the tariff treatment to analyse the determinants of strike willingness, focusing on behavioural responses within a collective bargaining context. Experiment 3 compares exit and voice responses within individuals in the job treatment by combining a job-acceptance FSE with a strike-propensity FSE, allowing for an assessment of whether exit and voice function as substitute behavioural strategies.
The target sample size is approximately 900 respondents per treatment (around 1,800 in total). DCE data will be analysed using multinomial logit models, while FSE outcomes will be estimated using linear mixed-effects models and respondent fixed-effects specifications, depending on the experimental module and research question.
Intervention
This study examines how institutional framing affects the evaluation of employment conditions and behavioural responses in the labour market. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two institutional frames that describe identical employment conditions in different ways. In the job-search framing, employment conditions are presented as individual job offers that workers encounter when searching for a new job. In the collective bargaining framing, the same employment conditions are presented as outcomes of negotiated tariff agreements between employers and unions.
Across both frames, employment packages vary along four core attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees against dismissal. Attribute levels are expressed relative to respondents’ current employment conditions in order to make the scenarios realistic and comparable to common labour market changes.
Participants complete several survey-based experimental tasks. In a discrete choice experiment, respondents repeatedly choose between hypothetical employment packages that differ in their attribute levels. In additional factorial survey experiments, respondents evaluate hypothetical scenarios describing employment conditions and report behavioural intentions such as willingness to participate in a strike or likelihood of accepting an alternative job offer.
The experimental variation of employment attributes allows the study to estimate how workers value different job characteristics and how these valuations translate into behavioural responses such as job exit or participation in collective action.
Experimental design
The study consists of three survey-based experiments designed to examine how workers evaluate employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into behavioural responses in the labour market.
Participants are randomly assigned to one of two institutional frames. In the job-search framing, employment conditions are presented as individual job offers encountered during job search. In the collective bargaining framing, identical employment conditions are described as negotiated outcomes of collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions. The framing treatment allows the study to examine whether institutional context affects how workers evaluate employment conditions.
Across treatments, employment packages vary along four attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees against dismissal. Attribute levels are expressed relative to respondents’ current employment situation. These attributes are experimentally varied across tasks.
The experimental design consists of three modules. Experiment 1 is a discrete choice experiment in which respondents repeatedly choose between alternative employment packages. Experiment 2 is a factorial survey experiment in the collective bargaining framing that measures respondents’ willingness to support collective action, such as participating in a strike, under different tariff agreements. Experiment 3 consists of factorial survey experiments in the job-search framing that measure respondents’ behavioural intentions along the exit and voice margins, including the likelihood of accepting alternative job offers and the willingness to participate in collective action.
Because employment attributes are experimentally varied across decision tasks, the design allows causal estimation of how economic conditions and institutional framing affect both preference formation and behavioural responses.
Design details
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