Exit and Voice under Different Institutional Frames: Evidence from Job-Search and Collective Bargaining Survey Experiments

How to cite

Jorck, Gerrit von; Börger, Tobias; Meyerhoff, Jürgen. 2026. "Exit and Voice under Different Institutional Frames: Evidence from Job-Search and Collective Bargaining Survey Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018142. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18142-1.0

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Gerrit von Jorck* , Tobias Börger , Jürgen Meyerhoff

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018142
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18142-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-03-25 – 2026-09-30
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
C93, D91, J31, J51, J63
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18142

Abstract

This study pursues both empirical and methodological objectives. On the empirical side, it builds on Hirschman’s (1970) exit–voice framework to examine how employed individuals evaluate core employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into two distinct responses to dissatisfaction: exit, defined as willingness to change positions, and voice, defined as willingness to participate in industrial action. The design allows the analysis to move beyond preference measurement by linking workers’ evaluations of job attributes to behavioural intentions across different institutional contexts.
On the methodological side, the study contributes to the labour-economics literature on wage–amenity trade-offs and institutional framing in stated-preference experiments, where most preference-elicitation experiments frame employment decisions as choices between job advertisements. The present design contrasts this conventional job-search framing with an alternative collective bargaining framing that presents employment conditions as negotiated tariff outcomes, while holding all employment attributes constant. This comparison allows us to assess whether institutional framing systematically affects estimated preferences and the interpretation of wage–amenity trade-offs.
Across both treatments, employment packages vary along four attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees. Attribute levels are expressed as deviations from respondents’ current employment situation and reflect magnitudes commonly observed in job changes and collective bargaining agreements. Using a common attribute framework ensures comparability across all experimental modules.
Analytically, the study consists of three complementary experiments with distinct objectives. Experiment 1 employs a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to identify framing effects on preferences by comparing income-equivalent valuations of employment attributes across the job-search and tariff treatment. Rather than directly contrasting raw coefficient estimates, the analysis focuses on marginal rates of substitution between non-wage attributes and income, derived under a linear income specification, thereby allowing meaningful comparison of wage–amenity trade-offs across institutional contexts. Experiment 2 uses a factorial survey experiment (FSE) in the tariff treatment to analyse the determinants of strike willingness, focusing on behavioural responses within a collective bargaining context. Experiment 3 compares exit and voice responses within individuals in the job treatment by combining a job-acceptance FSE with a strike-propensity FSE, allowing for an assessment of whether exit and voice function as substitute behavioural strategies.
The target sample size is approximately 900 respondents per treatment (around 1,800 in total). DCE data will be analysed using multinomial logit models, while FSE outcomes will be estimated using linear mixed-effects models and respondent fixed-effects specifications, depending on the experimental module and research question.

Intervention

This study examines how institutional framing affects the evaluation of employment conditions and behavioural responses in the labour market. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two institutional frames that describe identical employment conditions in different ways. In the job-search framing, employment conditions are presented as individual job offers that workers encounter when searching for a new job. In the collective bargaining framing, the same employment conditions are presented as outcomes of negotiated tariff agreements between employers and unions.

Across both frames, employment packages vary along four core attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees against dismissal. Attribute levels are expressed relative to respondents’ current employment conditions in order to make the scenarios realistic and comparable to common labour market changes.

Participants complete several survey-based experimental tasks. In a discrete choice experiment, respondents repeatedly choose between hypothetical employment packages that differ in their attribute levels. In additional factorial survey experiments, respondents evaluate hypothetical scenarios describing employment conditions and report behavioural intentions such as willingness to participate in a strike or likelihood of accepting an alternative job offer.

The experimental variation of employment attributes allows the study to estimate how workers value different job characteristics and how these valuations translate into behavioural responses such as job exit or participation in collective action.

Experimental design

The study consists of three survey-based experiments designed to examine how workers evaluate employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into behavioural responses in the labour market.

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two institutional frames. In the job-search framing, employment conditions are presented as individual job offers encountered during job search. In the collective bargaining framing, identical employment conditions are described as negotiated outcomes of collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions. The framing treatment allows the study to examine whether institutional context affects how workers evaluate employment conditions.

Across treatments, employment packages vary along four attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees against dismissal. Attribute levels are expressed relative to respondents’ current employment situation. These attributes are experimentally varied across tasks.

The experimental design consists of three modules. Experiment 1 is a discrete choice experiment in which respondents repeatedly choose between alternative employment packages. Experiment 2 is a factorial survey experiment in the collective bargaining framing that measures respondents’ willingness to support collective action, such as participating in a strike, under different tariff agreements. Experiment 3 consists of factorial survey experiments in the job-search framing that measure respondents’ behavioural intentions along the exit and voice margins, including the likelihood of accepting alternative job offers and the willingness to participate in collective action.

Because employment attributes are experimentally varied across decision tasks, the design allows causal estimation of how economic conditions and institutional framing affect both preference formation and behavioural responses.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is implemented by the survey software using computer-generated random assignment. Respondents are randomly assigned to either the job-search framing or the collective bargaining framing with equal probability. The assignment occurs automatically when respondents enter the experimental module of the survey.
Randomization unit
Randomization occurs at the individual respondent level. Each respondent is assigned to one of the two institutional framing conditions.
Clusters
Approximately 1,800 individual respondents.
Observations
Approximately 1,800 respondents completing the experimental survey.
Arms
Approximately 900 respondents in the job-search framing and 900 respondents in the collective bargaining framing.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcomes correspond to respondents’ choices and behavioural intentions across the three experimental modules. In Experiment 1 (Discrete Choice Experiment), the primary outcome is the choice between alternative employment packages that differ in income, working hours, vacation days, and employment guarantees. These employment packages are presented either under a job-search framing, where they represent individual job offers, or under a collective bargaining framing, where they represent negotiated tariff outcomes. The outcome variable records which employment package respondents choose in each decision task. In Experiment 2 (Tariff Factorial Survey Experiment), the primary outcome is strike willingness. Respondents evaluate hypothetical tariff agreements that differ in employment conditions and report their willingness to support collective action such as participating in a strike. In Experiment 3 (Exit–Voice Factorial Survey Experiments), the primary outcomes are exit and voice behavioural intentions. Exit is measured as the stated likelihood of accepting an alternative job offer under different employment conditions. Voice is measured as the stated willingness to participate in collective action in response to changes in employment conditions. Together, these outcomes capture how workers evaluate employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into behavioural responses across different institutional contexts.
Secondary outcomes
The study also collects several secondary outcomes that capture respondents’ perceptions of the experimental tasks and their interpretation of the decision context. These secondary outcomes include: Perceived realism of the experimental tasks, measuring whether respondents considered the presented scenarios realistic and comparable to real-life employment decisions. Collective orientation in decision-making, capturing whether respondents interpreted the decision context primarily as an individual employment decision or as part of a collective labour relations context. These outcomes are measured using post-experimental survey items administered after the experimental tasks.

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