Information Frictions, Screening, and Matching in Apprenticeship Markets
How to cite
Tommasi, Denni; Wicker, Till; Vacante, Roberto. 2026. "Information Frictions, Screening, and Matching in Apprenticeship Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018082. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18082-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Labor markets in low-income settings are shaped by pervasive frictions. Thin labor demand and weak intermediation networks, limited screening capacity, and imperfect information on both sides of the market can generate misaligned expectations, misdirected search, and low-quality matches (Breza and Kaur, 2025; Caria and Orkin, 2024). In this project – rather than focusing on firm-side screening and monitoring (see Bassi and Nansamba, 2022) – we randomize personalized information provided to workers about sector- and employer-specific hiring feasibility, and examine how this shapes their employment preferences, and which sectors they target. We will implement a two-sided incentivized résumé-rating (IRR) design (Kessler et al., 2019) that separately measures (i) firm-side screening and (ii) worker-side beliefs and targeting. The study takes place in West Nile, Uganda, a border region adjacent to South Sudan, where the labor market includes both local Ugandan workers and a large population of refugees. We partner with approximately 120 firms offering a total of 216 job posts and recruit around 800 job seekers to participate in the matching process.
Intervention
800 young jobseekers residing in Uganda’s West Nile region submit Expressions of Interest (EOI, containing basic demographic information), to be selected for ACAV’s 10-month vocational training program. This program consists of formal training, and an apprenticeship. In the EOI, jobseekers indicate their preferred areas of employment (e.g., tailoring, mechanic).
Based on the demographic information collected in the EOIs, we will construct 4,000 randomized candidate CVs that reflect the population demographics of the 800 young jobseekers. The hiring managers of the 120 firms (with 216 vacancies) participating in this study will then evaluate a random subset of 32 of these hypothetical CVs, rank their interest in the profile on a scale of 1-10, and shortlist 8 CVs. As such, firms undergo an incentivized résumé-rating (IRR; Kessler et al., 2019). The firm-side IRR will provide insights about which traits firms value, and will be used to calculate a predictive hiring probability for each worker–firm pair.
Subsequently, the 800 young jobseekers will complete an IRR, by evaluating 18 hypothetical firm profiles across their preferred areas of work, drawn from firm profiles. The hypothetical firm profiles will be based on data of the 120 participating firms. For each profile that workers see, they must indicate their interest in working for this firm (with a binding cap that limits how many firms workers can signal their interest to).
Among the young jobseekers who complete the IRR, there are two treatment arms. In the Control arm, jobseekers merely see the hypothetical firm profiles. In the Treatment arm, the jobseeker sees the hypothetical firm profiles along with their personalized predictive hiring probability per firm profile, based on the calculations done following the firm-side IRR.
After the firm- and worker-side IRRs have been completed, the preferences of both firms and workers will be used to select the 216 jobseekers for the available vacancies.
Workers and firms will be monitored during the vocational training program, apprenticeship, and for 6 months afterwards.
Experimental design
The study uses a two-sided IRR design. First, firms participate in a within-firm 2x2 randomized CV-rating exercise that varies refugee status and ACAV quality certification across hypothetical worker profiles. Second, workers are randomized to Control or Treatment in the worker-side IRR, where the treatment reveals a personalized screening-feasibility signal. The study then follows the resulting allocations into real vocational placements and post-program outcomes.
Design details
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