Equality of Opportunity and Preferences for Redistribution

How to cite

Nuutinen, Juho. 2026. "Equality of Opportunity and Preferences for Redistribution." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018070. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18070-1.3

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Juho Nuutinen*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0018070
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18070-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-04-01 – 2026-10-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C91 Laboratory, Individual Behavior, D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, D64 Altruism, Philanthropy, Intergenerational Transfers, D31 Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/18070

Abstract

A prominent stylized fact in contemporary inequality research is that countries with greater inequality of incomes also tend to be countries in which family background plays a stronger role in determining the adult outcomes of young people. This association is commonly referred to as The Great Gatsby Curve. In my research, I examine individuals' fairness views regarding equality of opportunity and intergenerational inequality in a controlled and incentivized experimental framework. More specifically, the empirical approach is the setting where participants act as impartial third-party spectators and make real redistribution decisions on initial allocations. Main research questions are as follows: First, do differences in parental merit justify unequal opportunities for the children? Second, assuming that equality of opportunity is causally connected to the level of cross-sectional inequality, how do individuals weigh the two potentially different fairness judgements concerning the two generations?

Intervention

Participants assigned the role of impartial third-party spectators are presented with a real redistribution decision involving workers and their adult children. Across treatment conditions, the redistribution decision concerns either parents' earnings or the children's playing field, or both (in the two so-called Gatsby treatments). Pre-redistribution inequality is varied by describing the initial allocations as resulting from luck (lottery) or merit (productivity in the assignment).

Experimental design

This is an online, individual-level randomized experiment conducted on Prolific. Participants are randomly assigned to one of six treatment conditions in a between-subjects design. After consent and instructions, participants complete the allocation task and will be asked post-experiment questions, including a few demographic questions. The target sample is 2400 participants, with approximately 400 in each treatment condition.

The parents and their adult children who solely have the role of incentivizing the spectators' redistribution decisions are the workers in the experiment. The worker-part of the experiment is also conducted online. The target is 168 parents and their 168 adult children via The Helsinki Laboratory for Behavioral and Experimental Studies (Helsinki LABBET). This would mean that each spectator decision is implemented with a probability of approximately 1/19.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants are randomly assigned by computer in oTree to treatment conditions using balanced randomization, with treatment cell sizes constrained to be as equal as possible. Worker participant parents are randomly assigned to payment condition (luck vs. merit) by computer upon entering the experiment. They are also randomly matched into pairs by computer. For payment implementation, worker pairs (parent-child pairs) are randomly matched to randomly selected spectator decisions.
Randomization unit
Individual participant (spectator). Treatment assignment is at the individual level.
Clusters
2400 individual spectators
Observations
2400 individual spectator decisions
Arms
Approximately 400 individual spectators in each of 6 treatment arms
Primary outcomes
Primary Outcome 1: Implemented post-redistribution inequality in earnings between Worker A and Worker B. Primary Outcome 2: Implemented post-redistribution inequality in the multipliers (i.e. piece rates) between Child A and Child B.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary Outcome 1: Relative share of total income allocated to the worker with zero initially. Secondary Outcome 2: Relative share of total sum of the multipliers allocated to the child with zero initially.

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Keywords