Tied Together: Bundling, Bargaining, and Technology Adoption
How to cite
Badio, Levenson; Palma, Marco; Nayga, Rodolfo Jr; Zapata, Samuel. 2026. "Tied Together: Bundling, Bargaining, and Technology Adoption." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018061. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18061-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
When decision rights and use rights are separated within the household, technologies benefiting low-bargaining-power members are systematically under-adopted, even when socially efficient. This paper studies whether bundling a female-targeted attribute with a male-valued attribute can mitigate this friction. Our collective-household framework shows that
pairing a wife-valued improved
cookstove with a charger carrying a male net premium moves joint valuation
toward the wife's private valuation, narrows gender gaps in willingness to pay, attenuates the sensitivity of adoption to Pareto weights.
We will test these predictions using a lab-in-the-field experiment with dual-spouse households in rural Haiti, using a between-subject design eliciting individual and joint valuations for an improved cookstove, a solar charger, and an integrated coosktove-solar charger bundle.
Intervention
The randomized intervention changes the decision context under which dual-spouse households value household technologies.
In the individual-decision arm, the wife and husband are interviewed separately and privately. Each spouse independently submits one willingness-to-pay bid for each technology option and acts as the sole decision-maker for that recorded spouse-technology decision. Spouses cannot communicate, consult, approve, change or veto one another’s bids.
In the joint-decision arm, spouses deliberate together and submit one mutually acknowledged household bid for each technology option. The enumerator does not participate in the deliberation, average proposed amounts or select a bid on the couple’s behalf. If the spouses do not reach a mutually acknowledged bid, disagreement is recorded and no purchase is authorized for that decision.
In both arms, participants value three purchase options: a standalone improved cookstove, a standalone solar charger and a stove-charger product. The same standardized product information, bid support, BDM procedure, ownership rules and settlement procedure apply across decision-context arms. The potential voucher, any acquired technology and any residual voucher balance are household resources. Treatment assignment therefore changes decision authority and deliberation while holding ownership and experimental incentives constant.
Each spouse receives a fixed completion payment. A single binding lottery determines whether an experimental purchase decision is implemented. The selection procedure is independent of all submitted bids, and a household can receive at most one technology option.
Experimental design
The study is a 2 by 3 mixed experimental design. Decision context is randomized between households, while three technology options are valued within households.
The target population consists of dual-spouse households in eight randomly selected villages in rural northern Haiti. A complete roster of potentially eligible households will be prepared before recruitment. Eligible households will be randomly invited using an order generated by the research team.
A household is eligible if:
it contains two cohabiting adults who are married or living in a consensual union;
it currently relies on an open fire, traditional charcoal stove or another eligible traditional cooking technology;
it lacks electricity at the dwelling;
both spouses are between 18 and 65 years old;
the husband owns or is the primary user of at least one rechargeable electronic device, such as a phone or radio; and
the household does not own a solar charger, home solar system or another in-home charging source.
Both spouses first provide informed consent and complete a common baseline questionnaire in separate interview spaces. The women’s bargaining-power module is administered privately. Both spouses then receive generic BDM training and complete the same comprehension assessment. Households failing the comprehension assessment after one standardized retraining are not randomized. This determination occurs before treatment assignment and before any product-specific WTP outcome is collected.
After the baseline and comprehension records are electronically locked, 300 households will be randomly assigned in equal proportions to the individual-decision arm or joint-decision arm. Randomization will be conducted within village-session strata using computer-generated permuted blocks of four containing two assignments to each arm. Enumerators cannot access the assignment before pre-randomization records have been completed and locked.
Within each decision-context arm, product-presentation order will be independently randomized across the six possible sequences of the cookstove, solar charger and stove-charger product. Sequence randomization will use blocks of six containing each sequence exactly once. In the individual-decision arm, spouses from the same household receive the same assigned product sequence while completing the bidding tasks separately.
All three options are valued using the same incentivized BDM procedure. A potential household voucher is used for the purchase decisions, and participants may not add personal funds. The random transaction price is not revealed until all bids for the household have been recorded. A single binding lottery first determines whether any decision is implemented and then selects the technology option. In individual-decision households, one spouse is also randomly selected, and the selected spouse’s previously recorded bid for the selected technology is implemented. In joint-decision households, the couple’s joint bid is implemented. A household can receive at most one technology option.
Design details
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