Cooperation and Spillovers under Group-Level Regulatory Allocation
How to cite
zhang, chenxi; Lao, Yao. 2026. "Cooperation and Spillovers under Group-Level Regulatory Allocation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0018023. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18023-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines how regulatory interventions affect cooperation in repeated social dilemmas, with a particular focus on spillover effects that persist after external enforcement is removed. We employ a laboratory experiment in which 252 participants play a two-person finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (T=90, R=60, P=55, S=10) over 24 rounds divided into two phases.In Phase 1 (Rounds 1–12), participants are randomly and fixedly matched and subject to one of five between-subjects treatments that vary the scope and information structure of a forced-compliance regulation mechanism. Unlike standard punishment mechanisms, the regulation imposes no financial penalties; instead, defection choices are automatically corrected to cooperation, allowing us to isolate the behavioral effects of regulation from deterrence. The five treatments are: No Monitor (baseline), Two Monitor (both partners monitored), One Monitor (one partner monitored with immediate disclosure), Random Monitor (one partner monitored with delayed disclosure), and Half Monitor (half of pairs fully monitored with delayed disclosure). In Phase 2 (Rounds 13–24), all regulation is removed and participants are re-matched with new partners, enabling identification of post-regulatory spillover effects.
Intervention
The experiment implements five between-subjects treatments that vary the scope and information structure of a forced-compliance regulatory mechanism in Phase 1 (Rounds 1–12). In all treatments, if a monitored participant chooses to defect, the system automatically corrects the choice to cooperation; no financial penalty is imposed.
No Monitor (control): No regulation in either phase. Participants make unrestricted choices throughout.
Two Monitor: Both partners in each pair are monitored and subject to forced compliance in Phase 1. Monitoring status is disclosed to both parties before Phase 1 begins.
One Monitor: One participant per pair is randomly selected for monitoring in Phase 1. Both partners are informed of who is monitored before Phase 1 begins (immediate disclosure). At the start of Phase 2, participants are additionally informed of their new partner's Phase 1 monitoring status.
Random Monitor: One participant per pair is randomly monitored in Phase 1, but monitoring status is disclosed to participants only after Phase 1 ends (delayed disclosure). During Phase 1, participants are unaware of whether they or their partner are monitored.
Half Monitor: Half of all pairs are randomly selected for full monitoring (both partners) in Phase 1; the remaining pairs are unmonitored. Monitoring status is disclosed only after Phase 1 ends (delayed disclosure).
In Phase 2 (Rounds 13–24), all regulation is removed across all treatments. Participants are re-matched with new partners and play the Prisoner's Dilemma without any enforcement.
Experimental design
No Monitor (control): No regulation in either phase. Participants make unrestricted choices throughout.
Two Monitor: Both partners in each pair are monitored and subject to forced compliance in Phase 1. Monitoring status is disclosed to both parties before Phase 1 begins.
One Monitor: One participant per pair is randomly selected for monitoring in Phase 1. Both partners are informed of who is monitored before Phase 1 begins (immediate disclosure). At the start of Phase 2, participants are additionally informed of their new partner's Phase 1 monitoring status.
Random Monitor: One participant per pair is randomly monitored in Phase 1, but monitoring status is disclosed to participants only after Phase 1 ends (delayed disclosure). During Phase 1, participants are unaware of whether they or their partner are monitored.
Half Monitor: Half of all pairs are randomly selected for full monitoring (both partners) in Phase 1; the remaining pairs are unmonitored. Monitoring status is disclosed only after Phase 1 ends (delayed disclosure).
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.