Scaling and Equity Auctions: The Types-as-Marginal-Costs Case

How to cite

Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Novoa, Diego Carrasco; Mora, Ernesto Rivera. 2026. "Scaling and Equity Auctions: The Types-as-Marginal-Costs Case." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017929. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17929-1.0

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Zachary Breig* , Allan Hernandez-Chanto , Diego Carrasco Novoa , Ernesto Rivera Mora

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017929
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17929-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-03-02 – 2026-05-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C70, C90, D44, D47
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17929

Abstract

This study investigates behavior in experimental procurement auctions for the completion of projects. Projects require inputs, and these requirements are stochastic. Bidders' types are their marginal costs. Participants will be organized in groups of two and will participate in cash, scaling, and equity-bid auctions.

Intervention

The experiment will implement a mixed between- and within-subject design: participants will participate in 15 rounds of cash auctions and 15 rounds of either equity-bid or scaling auctions.

Experimental design

This study compares cash, scaling (unit-price), and equity-bid auctions under uncertainty about marginal costs. In each round, participants bid for the right to complete a project that requires two costly inputs and a fixed setup cost. In cash rounds, bidders specify their required payment (in points) and the lowest bidder wins. In the scaling treatment, bidders specify per-unit prices for each input, and the bidder with the lowest score (sum of the per-unit prices) wins. In the equity treatment, bidders request a percentage reimbursement of their variable costs, and the lowest requested share wins. After winning, payoffs depend on realized input quantities, which vary randomly to capture cost uncertainty. All subjects participate in cash auctions in odd rounds, and either scaling or equity-bid auction in even rounds. Moreover, subjects are randomized into environments where input quantities are either positively or negatively correlated. The design allows us to compare how the different mechanisms allocate risk and select efficient providers when project requirements are uncertain.

Design details

Randomization method
The experimental software will randomize automatically. Groups and types are re-randomized each round.
Randomization unit
Groups and types are re-randomized each round.
Clusters
Our final sample is expected to be 135-155 subjects.
Observations
With 144 subjects participating in 30 rounds, the total number of observations is expected to be 4320 bids and 2160 auctions.
Arms
We expect to have 36 subjects in each of the four between-subject treatments.
Primary outcomes
The focus of our study will be the outcomes of the auctions, both in terms of the expected amount the auctioneer would need to pay the winning bidder (the equivalent of the auctioneer's earnings in a standard auction) and the expected costs that would need to be spent on the project (equivalent to efficiency).

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Keywords