Scaling and Equity Auctions: The Types-as-Marginal-Costs Case
How to cite
Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Novoa, Diego Carrasco; Mora, Ernesto Rivera. 2026. "Scaling and Equity Auctions: The Types-as-Marginal-Costs Case." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017929. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17929-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates behavior in experimental procurement auctions for the completion of projects. Projects require inputs, and these requirements are stochastic. Bidders' types are their marginal costs. Participants will be organized in groups of two and will participate in cash, scaling, and equity-bid auctions.
Intervention
The experiment will implement a mixed between- and within-subject design: participants will participate in 15 rounds of cash auctions and 15 rounds of either equity-bid or scaling auctions.
Experimental design
This study compares cash, scaling (unit-price), and equity-bid auctions under uncertainty about marginal costs. In each round, participants bid for the right to complete a project that requires two costly inputs and a fixed setup cost. In cash rounds, bidders specify their required payment (in points) and the lowest bidder wins. In the scaling treatment, bidders specify per-unit prices for each input, and the bidder with the lowest score (sum of the per-unit prices) wins. In the equity treatment, bidders request a percentage reimbursement of their variable costs, and the lowest requested share wins. After winning, payoffs depend on realized input quantities, which vary randomly to capture cost uncertainty. All subjects participate in cash auctions in odd rounds, and either scaling or equity-bid auction in even rounds. Moreover, subjects are randomized into environments where input quantities are either positively or negatively correlated. The design allows us to compare how the different mechanisms allocate risk and select efficient providers when project requirements are uncertain.
Design details
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