Performance based contracts in healthcare: experimental evaluation of contracting based on inputs and outcomes

How to cite

Mohanan, Manoj; Miller, Grant. 2013. "Performance based contracts in healthcare: experimental evaluation of contracting based on inputs and outcomes." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000179. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.179-6.0

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Manoj Mohanan* , Grant Miller

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000179
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.179-6.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2013-02-01 – 2014-06-30
Countries
India (Karnataka)
JEL codes
I10, I130, J330, O150
Secondary IDs
ClinicalTrials: NCT01480544
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/179

Abstract

Despite recent increases in institutional deliveries in India, birth outcomes have been slow to improve. One likely explanation is low quality medical care, which is common in many parts of India. Low quality medical care in India cannot simply be attributed to insufficient medical knowledge among providers. Instead there is evidence that, even among knowledgeable clinicians, provider effort is very low – suggesting poor alignment between clinician incentives and patient health.

To address low quality medical care directly, we are conducting a policy experiment in Karnataka to evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives to maternity care providers for (a) the clinical quality of services (e.g., assessing the mother’s blood pressure on arrival during labor) provided to women from their patient lists and catchment areas, and (b) rates of adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (e.g., rates of post-partum hemorrhage) among women from their patient lists and catchment areas. Performance bonuses for clinical quality hold some promise for better aligning physician incentives with patient needs. Moreover, directly rewarding lower rates of adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes flexibly identifies a socially desirable outcome without rigidly prescribing how it should be achieved – allowing local providers to use their local knowledge of what health improvement strategies are likely to work best.

Experimental design

Providers are randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups, where incentive payments are based on health care quality or health outcomes, or to a control group.

Design details

Randomization method
by computer
Randomization unit
health care provider
Clusters
164 health care providers
Observations
15,000 women
Arms
47 providers in inputs group (incentive payments for quality of care) 60 providers in outputs group (incentive payments for health outcomes) 57 providers in control group
Primary outcomes
quality of obstetric care, maternal and neonatal health outcomes

Cited by

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Keywords