Learning in Job Search

How to cite

Vecchi, Martina; Rattini, Veronica. 2026. "Learning in Job Search." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017896. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17896-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Martina Vecchi* , Veronica Rattini

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017896
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17896-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-02-17 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17896

Abstract

This study investigates how individuals adjust their job search decisions when learning from others or from artificial intelligence (AI). We conduct an online experiment with 1,600 participants from the US, adapting the sequential job search design of Cortés et al. (2023). The experiment begins with a real-effort typing task that determines participants’ likelihood of receiving higher or lower wage offers. Participants then engage in up to five rounds of simulated job search, using the strategy method: in each round, they state beliefs about their typing ability and a minimum acceptable wage (reservation wage), but receive no feedback until the end of the study.
We introduce new information treatments to examine how people learn from different sources. Some participants receive information about top performers of the same or different gender (“social learning”), while others are shown an algorithm-generated optimal strategy (AI strategy) for a risk-neutral agent. Before information is revealed, participants state their willingness to pay (WTP) for access, using an incentivized Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism.
The experiment measures how social and algorithmic information influence belief accuracy, reservation wage choices, and job search outcomes, and whether gender identity moderates learning and the perceived value of information.

Intervention

The experiment consists of four main parts: a real-effort task, a five-round simulated job search task, a risk elicitation task using the multiple price list framework of (Andersen et al. 2006), and a final questionnaire.

Real-effort typing task:
Participants type 15 sequences of randomly generated letters as quickly as possible. Based on typing speed, participants are classified as fast typists or slow typists, using the top quartile cutoff from a pilot sample. This classification determines the probability of receiving higher or lower wage offers in the subsequent job search task.

Job search task (five rounds, strategy method):
After the typing task, participants complete a job search task lasting five rounds. In each round, they set a reservation wage and report their belief about being a fast typist. Wages are drawn from a fixed discrete distribution, with higher draws being more likely for fast typists. Participants receive no feedback about wage offers until the end of the experiment.
The structure of the job search task is as follows:
1. Baseline beliefs and reservation wage (round 1 only): participants report their belief about being a fast typist and their reservation wage for the round.
2. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) for information (round 1 only): participants state their WTP to access one of three types of information: reservation wage and beliefs of a same-gender top performer, reservation wage and beliefs of a different-gender top performer, or the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral fast-typist agent determined by an algorithm. For a randomly selected subset of participants, WTP is implemented through a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to determine whether the information is purchased.
3. Information treatment (rounds 1 to 5): Participants are randomly assigned to one of four treatment arms. Depending on treatment, they receive no information, social information about peers, or algorithmic information.
4. Beliefs and reservation wage (rounds 1 to 5, strategy method): After receiving information (if applicable), participants report their belief about being a fast typist and their reservation wage for that round (in round 1, they may revise them). In rounds 2–5, they continue to report these variables under the assumption that previous offers were below their reservation wage. No feedback about actual wage draws is provided until the end of the study.
5. Outcome determination: After all five rounds, wage offers are drawn according to each participant’s true typist classification. The first round in which the offer equals or exceeds the reservation wage determines the accepted job and final payment. If no offer meets the reservation wage by round 5, participants receive a fixed outside option.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of four main parts: a real-effort task, a five-round simulated job search task, a risk elicitation task using the multiple price list framework of (Andersen et al. 2006), and a final questionnaire.

Participants complete a real-effort typing task, typing 15 sequences of random letters as quickly and accurately as possible. Based on typing speed relative to a pilot sample, participants are classified as fast or slow typists. This classification determines their probabilities of receiving higher or lower wage offers in the subsequent job-search task.

The job-search task consists of five rounds, implemented using the strategy method. Each round, participants state a reservation wage (the minimum acceptable wage) and their beliefs about the probability of being a fast typist. Wage offers are then drawn from a fixed wage grid (e.g., 2–32 tokens, we kept the same grid as Cortes et al), conditional on their typist type. The first offer above the stated reservation wage is accepted; otherwise, participants receive an outside option (2 tokens, we kept the same value of Cortes et al). No feedback on realized offers is given until the end, so participants at each round state their reservation wage in case the drawn wage is lower than their reservation wage.
Before round 1, participants report:
• their beliefs about being a fast typist
• their reservation wage for the round
• their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for access to different information
Participants are randomly assigned to one of four treatments:
1. Control (no information)
2. Same-gender top performer – reservation wage of a top performer of the same gender
3. Different-gender top performer – reservation wage of a top performer of the opposite gender
4. Optimal strategy (AI) – algorithm-based optimal reservation wage for a risk-neutral fast typist
About 90% receive assigned information for free; 10% face a BDM mechanism, where information is shown only if WTP ≥ a randomly drawn price.
After seeing information (if any), participants may revise their beliefs and reservation wage (in round 1) and continue reporting them for rounds 2–5.
Payment: Final earnings are determined by the first accepted wage offer (or the outside option). BDM purchase costs of the information are deducted if applicable.

Design details

Randomization method
For the first wave, all recruited participants will be assigned to the control and AI condition initially. This will allow us to collect data on peers to then show participants in the other information treatments. In a second wave, participants will be assigned to all four groups. The study will use a random incentive system. Each participant will be informed ex ante that only one out of every two participants will be randomly selected for payment for one of the activities (either the risk-elicitation task or the job-search task). For participants selected for payment, earnings will be determined according to the rules of either the risk-elicitation task or the job search task. The random selection for payment will be conducted independently of treatment assignment, choices, and outcomes. All participants face the same expected probability of payment, and no deception is used.
Randomization unit
Individual level
Clusters
1600 participants
Observations
We aim to recruit around 1600 participants.
Arms
We aim to recruit around 1600 participants, evenly spread across treatment arms. 400 participants in the control group, 400 participants in the Optimal strategy (AI) group, 400 participants in the Same-gender top performer group, and 400 participants in the Different-gender top performer group.
Primary outcomes
Reservation wage (RW) Optimality of the reservation wage
Secondary outcomes
A. Job search outcomes: 1. Reservation wage updating (round 1) 2. Earnings (final accepted wage) 3. Rounds of acceptance 4. Reservation-wage dynamics B. Belief updating and accuracy: 5. Beliefs about being a fast typist 6. Beliefs updating 7. Belief accuracy - Simple binary correctness (dummy) 8. Belief accuracy – Brier score C. Information demand and valuation: 9. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) for information 10. Net benefit of information 11. BDM purchase indicator / compliance D. Heterogeneity and mechanisms: Treatment effect heterogeneity. We will explore whether treatment effects vary by: • participant gender • participant beliefs • baseline typing quartile, • baseline risk aversion, • and by whether the participant paid for information under the BDM mechanism.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords