Additional Experiment Treatment for “Communication, Guilt, and Agency Risk with Payoff Externalities”
How to cite
Cason, Timothy; Friesen, Lana; Gangadharan, Lata. 2026. "Additional Experiment Treatment for “Communication, Guilt, and Agency Risk with Payoff Externalities”." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017867. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17867-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Communication is effective in enhancing cooperation in strategic settings. This study examines situations where actions of principals and agents not only affect payoffs within the agency relationship but also have payoff externalities impacting others. Social efficiency is maximized only if all parties cooperate. We design an experiment to investigate how different types of communication affect cooperation and efficiency. Communication is hypothesized to impact beliefs, which affect the psychological costs, in particular, guilt, of choosing certain actions. It may also reduce social distance and enhance fairness concerns. A baseline treatment allows no communication opportunities. Three communication treatments introduce (a) a single, private message from the agent to the principal in each pair; and additionally, (b) private chat between the agent and principal within pairs, and (c) chat between all agents and principals whose payoffs are affected by actions. Participants provide complete, incentivized first and second order beliefs.
Intervention
Communication opportunities will be varied across treatments. This includes a no-communication baseline, and treatments in which the agent in each pair can send a single, private message to their principal before choices are made, as well as rich and free form (chat) communication between both agents and both principals whose payoffs are affected by actions. The initial results indicate a large difference in cooperative actions from the group chat. This preregistration adds a new treatment to help identify the reasons for this large treatment effect, which allows for rich and free form (chat) communication between only the agent and principal within each principal-agent pair. Following this dialog, the agent in each pair can send a single, private message to their principal.
Experimental design
This is a laboratory experiment, conducted in a standard university experimental economics lab, recruiting students broadly across the university. Subjects will be randomly assigned to treatments, and then randomly assigned to roles (agents or principals) and into pairs to make a choice.
Within each principal-agent pair, the principal chooses IN or OUT and the agent chooses HIGH or LOW (effort). The OUT choice corresponds to an outside option for which the agent’s choice is irrelevant; the IN choice leads the pair’s earnings to depend on the agent’s effort choice. These choices have payoff externalities for one other principal-agent pair, so final earnings depend on the binary choices of four subjects in each group. Efficient cooperation is achieved only if both principals choose IN and both agents choose HIGH.
Design details
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