Monetary Incentive Effects on Partisan Disbelief
How to cite
Kikuchi, Shinnosuke; Kasuya, Yuko; Kishishita, Daiki; Kweon, Yesola. 2026. "Monetary Incentive Effects on Partisan Disbelief." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017855. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17855-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This pre-registered study evaluates whether partisan disbelief—the tendency for partisans to perceive political outgroups as less knowledgeable—persists when respondents face monetary incentives for accuracy. We field a U.S. online survey with a sample size of 1,500, mirroring the baseline study design, and elicit (i) respondents’ own true/false judgments and confidence on a set of simple factual statements and (ii) their beliefs about the accuracy rates of different social groups in answering those same statements. The experiment randomizes monetary incentives at the belief-elicitation stage: prior to reporting perceived accuracy rates, half of respondents are informed that they can receive a $1 bonus with a probability that decreases in the absolute distance between their stated beliefs and realized group accuracy rates.
The core outcomes are respondents’ perceived accuracy gaps between in-group and out-group partisans across six partisan-relevant factual tasks, summarized by an individual-level disbelief measure (average perceived in-group accuracy minus perceived out-group accuracy). The primary hypotheses are: (1) in the control condition, Republican and Democratic supporters perceive their own party as more accurate than the opposing party, whereas non-partisans perceive no partisan accuracy gap; (2) the same pattern holds under incentives; and (3) monetary incentives do not significantly reduce partisan disbelief, implying no detectable difference in the disbelief measure between treated and control respondents. Supplementary analyses benchmark partisan disbelief against analogous disbelief between college and non-college groups (two additional tasks) and examine heterogeneity by socio-demographics, affective polarization, partisan composition of friends, and beliefs about education levels across parties.
Intervention
Participants are randomly assigned to either an incentive or control condition before they report beliefs about group accuracy rates.
Control: Participants report their best guesses of the accuracy rates of (i) Republican supporters, (ii) Democratic supporters, and (iii) non-partisans on each judgment task (and, for two tasks, the accuracy rates of college vs non-college groups), with no performance-based payment tied to these belief reports.
Incentive treatment: Participants receive information that they may earn a $1 bonus based on how close their reported beliefs are to the realized accuracy rates of the corresponding target group(s). The bonus is implemented as a probabilistic payment that decreases with the absolute prediction error (in percentage points) between the participant’s stated belief and the realized accuracy rate.
Experimental design
We field an online survey experiment in the United States with a target sample size of 1,500 respondents. The study measures respondents’ factual judgments on simple true/false statements and their beliefs about how accurate different social groups are in answering those statements. The key experimental feature is a randomized incentive condition: before respondents report beliefs about group accuracy, half are informed that they may earn an additional $1 bonus based on the accuracy of their belief reports, while the other half receive no accuracy-linked bonus. The primary outcome is the perceived accuracy gap between one’s own party and the opposing party, averaged across the partisan fact tasks, and the main comparison is between the incentive and control conditions. Full details are provided in the Pre-Analysis Plan.
Design details
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