Monetary Incentive Effects on Partisan Disbelief

How to cite

Kikuchi, Shinnosuke; Kasuya, Yuko; Kishishita, Daiki; Kweon, Yesola. 2026. "Monetary Incentive Effects on Partisan Disbelief." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017855. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17855-2.0

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Shinnosuke Kikuchi* , Yuko Kasuya , Daiki Kishishita , Yesola Kweon

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017855
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17855-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2026-02-11 – 2026-02-13
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
D72, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17855

Abstract

This pre-registered study evaluates whether partisan disbelief—the tendency for partisans to perceive political outgroups as less knowledgeable—persists when respondents face monetary incentives for accuracy. We field a U.S. online survey with a sample size of 1,500, mirroring the baseline study design, and elicit (i) respondents’ own true/false judgments and confidence on a set of simple factual statements and (ii) their beliefs about the accuracy rates of different social groups in answering those same statements. The experiment randomizes monetary incentives at the belief-elicitation stage: prior to reporting perceived accuracy rates, half of respondents are informed that they can receive a $1 bonus with a probability that decreases in the absolute distance between their stated beliefs and realized group accuracy rates.

The core outcomes are respondents’ perceived accuracy gaps between in-group and out-group partisans across six partisan-relevant factual tasks, summarized by an individual-level disbelief measure (average perceived in-group accuracy minus perceived out-group accuracy). The primary hypotheses are: (1) in the control condition, Republican and Democratic supporters perceive their own party as more accurate than the opposing party, whereas non-partisans perceive no partisan accuracy gap; (2) the same pattern holds under incentives; and (3) monetary incentives do not significantly reduce partisan disbelief, implying no detectable difference in the disbelief measure between treated and control respondents. Supplementary analyses benchmark partisan disbelief against analogous disbelief between college and non-college groups (two additional tasks) and examine heterogeneity by socio-demographics, affective polarization, partisan composition of friends, and beliefs about education levels across parties.

Intervention

Participants are randomly assigned to either an incentive or control condition before they report beliefs about group accuracy rates.

Control: Participants report their best guesses of the accuracy rates of (i) Republican supporters, (ii) Democratic supporters, and (iii) non-partisans on each judgment task (and, for two tasks, the accuracy rates of college vs non-college groups), with no performance-based payment tied to these belief reports.

Incentive treatment: Participants receive information that they may earn a $1 bonus based on how close their reported beliefs are to the realized accuracy rates of the corresponding target group(s). The bonus is implemented as a probabilistic payment that decreases with the absolute prediction error (in percentage points) between the participant’s stated belief and the realized accuracy rate.

Experimental design

We field an online survey experiment in the United States with a target sample size of 1,500 respondents. The study measures respondents’ factual judgments on simple true/false statements and their beliefs about how accurate different social groups are in answering those statements. The key experimental feature is a randomized incentive condition: before respondents report beliefs about group accuracy, half are informed that they may earn an additional $1 bonus based on the accuracy of their belief reports, while the other half receive no accuracy-linked bonus. The primary outcome is the perceived accuracy gap between one’s own party and the opposing party, averaged across the partisan fact tasks, and the main comparison is between the incentive and control conditions. Full details are provided in the Pre-Analysis Plan.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is implemented by the survey platform using a computer-based random number generator to assign respondents to the incentive or control condition with equal probability.
Randomization unit
Individual respondent.
Clusters
1,500 individuals
Observations
1,500 individuals
Arms
1,500 individuals
Primary outcomes
Perceived partisan accuracy gap (partisan disbelief), respondent-level. Among partisan respondents (Republican or Democratic supporters), the main endpoint is the perceived difference in accuracy between (i) supporters of the respondent’s own party and (ii) supporters of the opposing party, averaged across the six partisan fact tasks. Effect of incentives on perceived partisan accuracy gap. The main experimental endpoint is the difference in the respondent-level perceived partisan accuracy gap between the incentive condition and the control condition among partisan respondents.
Secondary outcomes
Perceived education-group accuracy gap (education disbelief), respondent-level. The perceived difference in accuracy between college graduates and non-college graduates, averaged across the two education tasks. Non-partisans’ perceived partisan accuracy gap. Among non-partisan respondents, the perceived difference in accuracy between Republican supporters and Democratic supporters, averaged across the partisan fact tasks. Overall perceived accuracy levels by target group. Average perceived accuracy rates assigned to each target group (Republican supporters, Democratic supporters, non-partisans; and, in the education tasks, college graduates and non-college graduates). Belief–reality calibration (absolute prediction error). The absolute difference between a respondent’s perceived accuracy rate for each target group and the corresponding realized accuracy rate, summarized across tasks and/or target groups. Confidence and own performance (descriptive). Respondents’ confidence in their own true/false answers and their own factual accuracy on the judgment tasks. Heterogeneity in partisan disbelief and calibration. Differences in the primary outcome and in calibration measures by pre-specified respondent characteristics (e.g., affective polarization, demographics, education, income, partisan composition of friends, and beliefs about college completion across parties).
Sponsors
Name: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Location: Tokyo, Japan Url: https://www.jsps.go.jp/english/

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Keywords