The Non-Working Wife as a Status Symbol: A Field Experiment in India

How to cite

Subramanian, Sneha; Oh, Suanna; Dizon-Ross, Rebecca; Sarsons, Heather. 2026. "The Non-Working Wife as a Status Symbol: A Field Experiment in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017786. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17786-1.0

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Sneha Subramanian* , Suanna Oh , Rebecca Dizon-Ross , Heather Sarsons

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017786
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17786-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2026-01-28 – 2027-04-30
Countries
India ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17786

Abstract

This study examines how social status concerns limit women’s participation in paid work in rural India. We design an incentivized choice experiment offering real work or training opportunities to married women, and examine how husbands’ acceptance of the offers change depending on the location of the activity. We hypothesize that (1) take-up will be lower for offers requiring mobility, even when safe transport is provided; and that (2) this drop will be greater for paid work compared to unpaid training, since commuting for paid jobs induces social status concerns as it signals financial distress to others. We further test whether coordination mechanisms—offering jobs only if multiple households agree to participate—can reduce reputational concerns and increase acceptance of women’s work.

Intervention

Please see the Experimental Design section.

Experimental design

We implement an incentivized choice experiment. Married men (husbands of women aged 18–45) are presented with a one-week job and training opportunities for their wives, which may be randomly implemented with some chance according to their responses.
The design systematically varies key dimensions of the opportunities:
Activity type: Paid work vs. training (with in-kind gifts instead of wages)
Location: At home, at a village clubhouse, or outside the village (with safe transportation provided)
Travel arrangement: Solo travel vs. travel with female companion(s)
Coordination: Job may be offered only if more than five households in the village agree to taking up the offer

Experiment 1: We will analyze how take-up of work and training vary across the following conditions.
a. Home: activity takes place at the respondent’s home, with female supervisors visiting.
b. Home with poster: Similar to the above. In addition, there will be posters put up in the village, describing the woman’s participation in the training or work activity at home.
c. Village clubhouse: activity takes place at a location inside the village, such as the village clubhouse where village meetings typically take place.
d. Outside village with co-travel: activity takes place at a workplace outside the village. Auto rickshaw pick-ups will be provided, allowing the wife to travel together with her female supervisor. Furthermore, they will travel with another woman from the village, who would be visiting the bank or block office near the workplace.
e. Outside village: activity takes place at a workplace outside the village. Auto rickshaw pick-ups will be provided, allowing the wife to travel together with her female supervisor.

Primary Hypotheses:
H1. Take-up of paid work offers will be significantly higher at home than outside the village (even with co-travel).
H2. The decreases in take-up when going from at-home to out-of-village opportunities will be larger for paid work than for training.
Secondary Hypotheses:
H3. Takeup of paid work will be lower outside the village (with co-travel) than in the clubhouse, and the decrease will be larger for paid work than it is for training.
H4. Takeup of paid work will be lower in the clubhouse than at home, and the decrease will be larger for paid work than it is for training.
H5. Increasing the wage paid for work will not change the fact that takeup of paid work falls off more when leaving the home than training (i.e., H2 will hold for the high payment treatment)
H6. Take-up of paid work offers will NOT be significantly higher at home without posters compared to when there are posters.
H7. The above hypotheses regarding paid work outside the village (H1-H3 and H5) will also hold for paid work outside the village without co travel.

Experiment 2: We will explore how allowing participants to coordinate in different ways before taking up jobs affects take-up. All of the offers allow for co-travelling, so the wife can travel with her female supervisor and at least one other woman from the village.
i. No coordination: Only one household in the village will get the job offer, and other people in the village will be informed that the respondent’s wife is the only woman in the village working in this job.
ii. Coordination with multiple workers: The job will take place only if more than five respondents have chosen the job offer. In addition, other people in the village will be informed that more than five respondents have chosen the job offer. The women from the households receiving the offers will all work at the same workplace but in separate rooms.

Primary Hypothesis:
H1. Offering households the opportunity to coordinate on accepting the job increases take-up more than no coordination.

More details are provided in the attached Pre-Analysis Plan.
.

Design details

Randomization method
All random assignments are generated by a computer program in the project office using a seed for reproducibility; allocations are revealed in person to all the respondents privately after all surveys in the village are completed.
Randomization unit
The Experiment 1 questions are randomized at the village level, to only describe training scenarios or paid work scenarios. Hence all the households in a random set of villages would receive questions only regarding take-up of training activities at different locations, and in the remaining villages, households will only discuss take-up of paid work activities at the corresponding locations. The second main set of questions will also be randomized at the village level, into either the no coordination question (E1) or the full coordination question (E2). Hence, all the households in a random set of villages will respond to the no coordination question and the rest will respond to the full coordination question. More details on the Randomization are available in the Pre Analysis Plan.
Clusters
170 villages
Observations
1700 households
Arms
About 90 villages for paid jobs, 70 villages for training, 10 villages for wage variation
Primary outcomes
Experiment 1: Gap in take-up of opportunities at home vs. outside the village (with co-travel) Experiment 2: Take-up of the offered job opportunity
Secondary outcomes
Experiment 1: Gap in take-up indicators across all of the locations and/or conditions (e.g., an indicator for accepting the job opportunity at home minus an indicator for accepting the job opportunity at the clubhouse, or an indicator for accepting the job opportunity at the clubhouse minus an indicator for accepting the job opportunity outside the village.)

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Keywords