Algorithmic Inequality, Contestability, and Policy Support

How to cite

Pignataro, Giuseppe. 2026. "Algorithmic Inequality, Contestability, and Policy Support." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017778. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17778-1.0

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Giuseppe Pignataro*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017778
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17778-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-02-01 – 2026-03-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17778

Abstract

Public administrations increasingly rely on algorithmic scoring to allocate scarce benefits. While automation can improve speed and consistency, it can also generate algorithmic inequality: systematic differences across groups in error rates and in access to correction channels. We map the model to a large-scale, two-wave randomized survey experiment in Italy (N ≈ 12,000) built around a realistic voucher allocation scenario, randomized information treatments, randomized outcomes, and incentivized choices that elicit willingness to pay (in lottery tickets) for explanation, appeal, and independent auditing. The framework delivers sharp predictions: information about inequality reduces support for algorithmic allocation; adding contestability and auditing mitigates the support decline but can increase inequality in effective access if recourse is unevenly costly. The design identifies both direct informational effects and structural primitives governing “recourse gaps” and “legitimacy gaps,” allowing a unified contribution to the literatures on algorithmic fairness, administrative burden, and political economy of the welfare state.

Intervention

Participants complete an online survey in Italy. All respondents read the same baseline vignette describing a public voucher program whose applications are processed using an automated scoring/verification procedure. The main intervention is a randomized informational message about algorithmic decision-making: (i) control (no substantive information about inequality), (ii) information emphasizing potential risks of algorithmic inequality, or (iii) information emphasizing risks plus institutional safeguards (explanations/report, right to review/appeal, independent audit). Respondents then answer questions and complete short decision tasks related to perceived fairness, trust, and willingness to use contestability tools.

Experimental design

Two-wave online survey experiment with individual-level randomization among a nationally stratified Italian sample. In Wave 1, respondents are randomized to different informational messages about algorithmic decision-making (control vs risk vs risk+ safeguards) and to a randomized vignette outcome (voucher granted vs denied). Outcomes include post-vignette trust/fairness measures and incentivized choices related to explanations and appeals. Wave 2 re-contacts the same respondents about one month later to measure persistence of key outcomes and to repeat/extend the contestability-choice module.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer-based randomization implemented in the survey software by the panel provider. Randomization is blocked within pre-defined strata. A fixed random seed and a log of assignments/draws are stored for reproducibility and audit.
Randomization unit
Individual respondent (person-level). Additional within-respondent randomizations (e.g., vignette outcome, randomized costs in incentivized tasks, order/A–B flips in pairwise comparisons) are also implemented at the individual level.
Clusters
Not clustered (individual-level randomization). Equivalent unit: 12,000 individuals.
Observations
12,000 adult respondents in Italy in Wave 1; all baseline respondents will be re-contacted for Wave 2 (expected retention <100%).
Arms
Planned Wave 1 allocation (approximate): Control: 4,000 individuals (with a pre-specified placebo split inside control; e.g., 2,800 pure control and 1,200 placebo-control neutral text) Treatment 1 (risk information): 4,000 individuals Treatment 2 (risk + safeguards information): 4,000 individuals
Primary outcomes
Procedural trust / legitimacy toward automated voucher allocation (post-vignette): perceived fairness of the procedure and trust in the procedure. Demand for explanations: binary choice to request an explanation/report (in the incentivized task). Demand for review/appeal (conditional on a negative outcome): binary choice to file a request for review/appeal (in the incentivized task).
Secondary outcomes
Policy support for using automated procedures in similar public programs (attitudinal support). Perceived algorithmic inequality: perceived risk that automated procedures generate unequal outcomes across social groups. Support for safeguards: support for requiring explanations, an appeal channel, and independent audits in algorithm-assisted public decisions. Safeguard preference score from choice tasks: number of times the respondent selects the option with stronger contestability features across a set of pairwise comparisons. Willingness to contribute to collective oversight: willingness to sacrifice lottery weight (tickets) for an audit/oversight option (measured as ticket allocation or stated choice, depending on implementation). Emotional reactions (e.g., anger/frustration/relief) after the vignette. Persistence and updating (Wave 2): re-measured trust/legitimacy and contestability demand outcomes one month later.

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Keywords