Algorithmic Inequality, Contestability, and Policy Support
How to cite
Pignataro, Giuseppe. 2026. "Algorithmic Inequality, Contestability, and Policy Support." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017778. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17778-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Public administrations increasingly rely on algorithmic scoring to allocate scarce benefits. While automation can improve speed and consistency, it can also generate algorithmic inequality: systematic differences across groups in error rates and in access to correction channels. We map the model to a large-scale, two-wave randomized survey experiment in Italy (N ≈ 12,000) built around a realistic voucher allocation scenario, randomized information treatments, randomized outcomes, and incentivized choices that elicit willingness to pay (in lottery tickets) for explanation, appeal, and independent auditing. The framework delivers sharp predictions: information about inequality reduces support for algorithmic allocation; adding contestability and auditing mitigates the support decline but can increase inequality in effective access if recourse is unevenly costly. The design identifies both direct informational effects and structural primitives governing “recourse gaps” and “legitimacy gaps,” allowing a unified contribution to the literatures on algorithmic fairness, administrative burden, and political economy of the welfare state.
Intervention
Participants complete an online survey in Italy. All respondents read the same baseline vignette describing a public voucher program whose applications are processed using an automated scoring/verification procedure. The main intervention is a randomized informational message about algorithmic decision-making: (i) control (no substantive information about inequality), (ii) information emphasizing potential risks of algorithmic inequality, or (iii) information emphasizing risks plus institutional safeguards (explanations/report, right to review/appeal, independent audit). Respondents then answer questions and complete short decision tasks related to perceived fairness, trust, and willingness to use contestability tools.
Experimental design
Two-wave online survey experiment with individual-level randomization among a nationally stratified Italian sample. In Wave 1, respondents are randomized to different informational messages about algorithmic decision-making (control vs risk vs risk+ safeguards) and to a randomized vignette outcome (voucher granted vs denied). Outcomes include post-vignette trust/fairness measures and incentivized choices related to explanations and appeals. Wave 2 re-contacts the same respondents about one month later to measure persistence of key outcomes and to repeat/extend the contestability-choice module.
Design details
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