Incentives for information sharing in the labour market

How to cite

Tariq, Rabbia. 2026. "Incentives for information sharing in the labour market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017763. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17763-3.0

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Rabbia Tariq*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017763
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17763-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2026-01-28 – 2026-02-16
Countries
Pakistan ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17763

Abstract

Despite widespread access to online job postings, large disparities in employment outcomes persist among similarly qualified candidates, suggesting that informational frictions extend beyond vacancy access. This paper argues that process knowledge about how hiring processes operate is a key and understudied source of advantage. Unlike vacancy information, process knowledge is unevenly distributed through social networks and is strategically costly to share in competitive, rank-order selection environments. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment with university students in Pakistan competing for real jobs, the paper causally examines how access to process knowledge affects information-sharing behaviour.

Intervention

This project studies information sharing behaviour in social networks using a lab-in-the-field experiment. The experiment distinguishes between (i) vacancy information and (ii) application-process knowledge that can improve performance in application stages (e.g., screening tests/interviews).

Experimental design

This project studies information sharing behaviour in social networks using a lab-in-the-field experiment. The experiment distinguishes between (i) vacancy information and (ii) application-process knowledge that can improve performance in application stages (e.g., screening tests/interviews).

Design details

Randomization method
Computer-generated random assignment.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomisation is the individual participant.
Clusters
30 sessions
Observations
800 participants
Arms
800 participants
Primary outcomes
Vacancy information sharing (both extensive and intensive margin); withholding margin
Secondary outcomes
Help sharing; Intent to apply for the job; perceived competitive threat, reciprocity expectations, perceived peer popularity and perceived peer ability.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords