D14 Household Saving • Personal Finance, C93 (Field Experiments), D52 Incomplete Markets, D91 Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making, G41 Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making in Financial Markets, O16 Financial Markets, O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, O44 Environment and Growth, Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages, D12 (Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis), Q42 (Alternative Energy Sources)
Yemen is a deeply understudied context and is in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Solar panels in Yemen offer among the highest returns on productive development aid globally, yet uptake of subsidized loans for solar panels is remarkably low. Most households that acquire panels pay cash, even when zero-interest financing is available at a lower total cost. Both cost savings and environmental benefits are substantial.
Yet loan-based development aid has remarkably low uptake compared with less-subsidized cash purchases. In this project, we explore the following question: How do conflict-affected preferences and beliefs shape decisions in contexts where resource constraints frequently bind, and savings are imperfectly fungible? What can these preferences and beliefs tell us about the impacts of targeted policies (including those operating through microfinance?
This question has impacts beyond Yemen. Understanding why households avoid loans despite favourable terms is critical for designing effective energy and financial access policies in fragile states, where microfinance-based aid programmes typically achieve only 20–25% take-up rates (Banerjee et al. 2015) and where the determinants of loan demand remain poorly understood.
To better understand the impact of policies in this context, we are conducting a rich behaviour survey and a framed field experiment that incorporates a detailed discrete choice experiment and a 9-cell (including control) randomized treatment to examine how constraints and constraint salience shape stated preferences and what each reveals about conditional purchasing behaviour.
Intervention
We conduct a framed field survey experiment in Yemen, focusing on discrete-choice decisions and estimating the marginal impact of loan attributes on loan selection and loan-versus-cash preference. In addition, we are evaluating:
1) constraints (income and expenditure categories), beliefs about loans 2) beliefs (about solar panel breakage, quality, banks, merchants, future events, income volatility) 3) preference parameters elicited regarding intertemporal preferences, present bias, naivete, sophistication, diminishing/increasing sensitivity in gains (risk aversion vs seeking), diminishing vs increasing sensitivity in losses, loss aversion, and social attitudes.
We use randomized constraint framing and randomized placement of the discrete choice experiment within the framed field experiment to evaluate the effects of expenditure and financial salience on preferences for loans versus cash and preferences over loan attributes. We compare these effects as interactions across critical demographic and preference parameters, and evaluate the direct heterogeneous preferences and the direct effects of framing (or mindset) and salience (or related mechanisms). We randomly assign each participant to one of nine conditions in a 3×3 between-subjects design, varying two dimensions that determine the constraint environment in which participants make their choices.
Experimental design
This study employs a 3x3 between-subjects factorial design that independently varies two dimensions of constraint salience in a discrete choice experiment (DCE) on solar panel financing in Yemen. Participants are randomly assigned to one of nine cells defined by the cross-tabulation of DCE timing and constraint-framing conditions, using SurveyCTO's random() function. DCE Structure Each participant sees 13 choice sets from one of three pre-assigned blocks (39 unique scenarios total). Each choice set presents four alternatives: a cash purchase from a bank, a cash purchase from a merchant, a loan from a bank, and a loan from a merchant. All alternatives vary in total cost (300,000-700,000 YER), and loan options additionally vary in duration (6 or 12 months), flexibility (none or skip one payment), and documentation requirements (simple or full). Experimental Dimensions Dimension 1: DCE Timing. The first dimension varies when in the survey the DCE appears, thereby varying the extent to which participants have reflected on their financial situation before making financing choices. The DCE appears either (1) early in the survey, after only demographics and basic solar questions; (2) after a detailed household expenditure module; or (3) after both the expenditure module and a financial assessment module covering income, debt experience, attitudes toward borrowing, and perceived consequences of loan default. Dimension 2: Constraint Framing. The second dimension varies the instructions given to participants immediately before the DCE. Participants are either (1) instructed to consider their current financial situation when choosing; (2) instructed to imagine they face no financial constraints and to choose based on genuine preference; or (3) given no framing instruction.
Design details
Randomization method
Randomization of which households are surveyed was done using STATA. All treatment randomization is conducted through SurveyCTO after a survey is launched. The randomization within survey occurs with equal probability of all treatment effects and a random selection of one of three sets of 13 DCE questions to be asked.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Individual-level clusters 1154-1936 (solely conditional on funding) (no clusters for individual analyses but cluster design for choice-level analysis in the DCE)
Observations
1,154 individual participants × 13 DCE choices each = 16,614 choice observations. Participants are drawn from three governorates in south Yemen: Aden, Hadramout, and Taiz using a stratified sampling method (equal numbers in each governorate, equal numbers in each major district, then population-weighted sampling within each district).
More participants will be included contingent on funding application approvals up to a maximum of 1,936 participants.
Arms
128-216 individuals per treatment arm (each with corresponding 13 DCE choices)
Primary outcomes
This framed field experiment incorporates outcomes from both the discrete choice experiment (focusing on different determinants of variable selection within choice sets and across individuals) and the co-moving mechanism analysis questions.
These outcomes are grouped into seven “primary” outcome families and two “secondary” outcome families; other associated variables are purely exploratory. While this is a substantial set of outcome families, they are necessitated by the diversity of conceptual elements that would not make sense to combine for the sake of power. Four families are “Primary outcomes” in the traditional sense of being explicit endpoints. The first is the set of outcomes related to loan aversion/loan preference, comprised of DCE choices and implicit willingness to pay for cash versus loans. The second is the set of loan attributes and the relative preference for different types of loan products. The third family is simply the binary choice selection decision in the DCE. Together, these provide the key “final” within-survey experimental outcomes.
The first three families, consisting of participant choices in the discrete choice experiment include individual-level valuation outcomes obtained by aggregating choices within an individual, the choice-level marginal probability of selection, and the marginal implied WTP of each attribute. These are obtained by evaluating the choices made in the DCE. Each choice set presents four alternatives that vary in multiple dimensions (e.g., cash versus loan, loan duration, fee/subsidy). All four vary in total cost (300,000–700,000 YER). This wide range is critical for identifying who is price-sensitive and who has preference-based aversion. When a participant chooses 600,000 YER in cash over a 350,000 YER loan, they are paying a 250,000 YER premium to avoid debt (conditional on all other attributes of the loan). Alternatively, some individuals may be willing to pay a substantial premium to secure debt-related financing (which is more typical of standard financing than of subsidized development aid financing). These premiums can then be decomposed into components attributable to the participant’s individual characteristics.
However, we also collect (the fourth primary outcome) a rich set of prior real-world outcomes which should not be affected (except through differential recollection) by the treatments, but are outcomes in the survey (in the sense of being regressed on underlying demographic variables, household status, and other pre-existing conditions) and fulfill triple roles as outcomes, moderators, and the contrast between these real-world outcomes and stated preferences is regressed on treatments to provide deeper insight into using survey experiments as a tool to enrich preference analysis beyond what standard surveys can provide.
Our fifth primary outcome family comprises a central mediator and secondary mediators of importance, including two moderators that are tested for mediation. The central mediator is participants’ self-evaluations of how they answered the DCE, whether according to their own constrained preferences or to deeper underlying preferences that reflect their unconstrained choice behaviour. We include the other suspected mediators in this family (beliefs that loans are Haram, i.e. "prohibited" and perceived repayment likelihood).
In the sixth family, we evaluate a hypothetical outcome with potentially substantial consequences: participants’ willingness to pay for a real solar loan and for the bank to come to them to help them fill out a loan application.
In the seventh, we incorporate all behavioural parameters used for both the reduced-form moderation analysis, evaluating when they must be considered in a dual role as mediators.
The families consist of the following variables:
Loan versus cash preferences (DCE-1)
Selected_Loan
Loan_selection_rate
Is_majority_cash
Always_cash
Always_loan
Loan_aversion_indicator
loan_pref_indicator
Loan_aversion_rate
Loan_aversion_premium
Mean_cost_chosen
WTP_loan_vs_cash
Cond_wtp_cash
Cond_wtp_loan
Family 2) DCE loan attribute selection; DCE-2
Selected_bank
Selected_long
Selected_flex
Selected_simple
bank_share
uncond_Bank_wtp
cond_Bank_wtp
cond_Merchant_wtp
Bank_share_cash_context
Bank_share_loan_context
Duration_12m_share
Duration_wtp
Cost_coefficient
Simple_docs_share
Simple_doc_wtp
Wtp_flex
Family 3) DCE-3
Selected
Family 4) Real world variables
Loan before
Solar ownership
Solar payment
Actual_loan_buyer
Dce_vs_actual_gap
Family 5) Key mediators*
Dce_pref_type
Repayment_beliefs*
Perceived likelihood of negative shock
Haram_beliefs_nointerest*
Family 6) “Real” WTP
Stated_solar_wtp
Stated_bank_wtp
Family 7) Behavioural Parameters
Beta
Delta
Beta_hat
Risk_elicitation_g1
Risk_elicitation_g2
Risk_elicitation_l1
Risk_elicitation_l2
Risk_mixed_1
Risk_mixed_2