Bidding against the machine: Preference elicitation in the presence of bots

How to cite

Moreira, Felipe Martins; Palma, Marco; Horlick, Benjamin; Drichoutis, Andreas. 2026. "Bidding against the machine: Preference elicitation in the presence of bots." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017750. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17750-1.0

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Felipe Martins Moreira* , Marco Palma , Benjamin Horlick , Andreas Drichoutis

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017750
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17750-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-02-02 – 2026-02-09
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D44, D47, D81, C90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17750

Abstract

Experimental economists increasingly rely on online experiments to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) values. However, administering and coordinating strategic interactions with simultaneous participation in online environments as required by many auction mechanisms remains challenging. Using automated agents (bots) offers a potential solution, but their influence on human bidding behavior is not well understood. Under expected utility theory and the independent private values framework, the Second-Price Auction (SPA) (Vickrey, 1961) is theoretically incentive compatible, meaning that bidding one’s true valuation is a weakly dominant strategy regardless of other participants’ bids. Hence, under expected utility theory, group size and composition should not affect bids. However, previous literature document deviations from optimal bids even in settings where the value of the item is fixed. This study employs the SPA mechanism to examine how the presence and proportion of computer-based bidders (bots) affect human bidding behavior and valuation outcomes. To address this, we implement a between-subjects experimental design in which human participants are randomly assigned to auction groups of four agents that vary exogenously in the number of humans and bot participants, while holding auction rules, information, and payoff structures constant. The experiment implements both induced-value auction tasks, which allow direct measurement of deviations from optimal bidding, as well as homegrown valuation tasks eliciting willingness-to-pay (WTP) for consumer goods. Based on the incentive compatibility of the second price auction, the null hypothesis is H0: Bots will not affect human bidding behavior. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then we expect higher dispersion of bids as
more bots are introduced in the bidding group.

Intervention

Participants complete a series of Second-Price Auction (SPA) tasks administered online. In each task, participants submit a sealed bid for a single unit of a good. The highest bidder wins the auction and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid. All participants receive detailed instructions explaining the auction rules and payoff structure prior to participation. The key experimental intervention is the exogenous variation in group composition, specifically the number of automated bidders (bots) participating alongside human subjects in the auction. All groups are composed of four agents. We exogenously vary the number of bots in a group (0, 1, 2, or 3) based on the treatment assignment. Bots submit bids according to a pre-programmed bidding rule described in the Experimental Design section below. Auction rules, information, and payoff parameters are held constant across treatments. The experiment consists of two parts, the homegrown valuation setting and the induced-value setting. The homegrown setting is composed of 4 rounds, and participants bid for real consumer goods to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP). The induced value setting is composed of two rounds and participants bid for tokens with known monetary redemption values, allowing direct measurement of deviations from truthful bidding.

Experimental design

The experiment follows a between-subjects design with three treatments and a control condition. Each participant is assigned to one condition that determines the human-to-bot composition of their auction group. Group composition remains fixed for the entire experiment. All auction groups consist of four bidders. Our treatments vary the number of bots present in the group: (i) T0: 4 humans and 0 bots (ii) T1: 3 humans and 1 bot (iii) T2: 2 humans and 2 bots (iv) T3: 1 human and 3 bots. Participants are informed that some auction participants are automated agents (bots) as well as of the number of humans and bots in their group. Automated bidders submit bids drawn independently from a uniform distribution over the interval ($0 - $8). The distribution is common knowledge to the participants. The experiment is divided in two parts. Part 1 is the homegrown valuation environment and has 4 tasks that will be completed in a randomized order. In task 1, subjects are asked to submit bids to buy a 24 fl oz bottle of peanut oil. In task 2, subjects are asked to submit bids to buy a 24 fl oz of soybean oil. Tasks 3 and 4 are with the same products, but this time subjects will be provided with health information about the products.
Part 2 is the induced value environment and has 2 tasks that will be completed in a randomized order. In each task, subjects are asked to submit bids to buy a token that is worth a fixed monetary value. In the first task, the induced value is $4, and in the second task, the induced value is $5. At the end of the experiment, 10% of participants are randomly selected for payoff realization. For selected participants, one task from each part is randomly drawn to determine their bonus compensation.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer
Randomization unit
Treatments are randomized at the individual level.
Clusters
Not clustered
Observations
6,480 observations (1,080 individuals and 6 rounds)
Arms
(i) T0 (4 humans and 0 bots): 270 subjects (∼68 groups), (ii) T1 (3 humans and 1 bot): 270 humans (90 groups), (iii) T2 (2 humans and 2 bots): 270 humans (135 groups), (iv) T3 (1 human and 3 bots): 270 humans (270 groups)
Primary outcomes
(a) Individual willingness-to-pay values in the homegrown valuation setting. (b) Deviation from truthful bidding in the induced value setting: i) absolute differences |Bid − V|. ii) relative absolute differences |Bid −V| / V.
Secondary outcomes
(a) Bid dispersion, measured by the variance and interquartile range of bids within treatments. (b) Frequencies of overbidding and underbidding relative to induced values. (c) Within-subject bid variability across repeated rounds.

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Keywords