Linking Taxes to Benefits: The Compliance Effects of a Landmark Project
How to cite
Schiavoni, Juan Luis. 2026. "Linking Taxes to Benefits: The Compliance Effects of a Landmark Project." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017651. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17651-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study evaluates whether increasing the salience of a large municipal infrastructure project affects local tax compliance. The intervention centers on the construction of a railway underpass, a highly visible public investment scheduled to begin in 2026 in the city of Caseros, Municipality of Tres de Febrero, Province of Buenos Aires. The project is financed through municipal revenues, mainly the Tasa por Servicios Generales (TSG), a property tax levied directly on owners according to the property assesment.
The experiment tests whether (i) explicitly linking the tunnel to municipal taxation, and (ii) further personalizing this information using geographic proximity to the project, increase property tax compliance. The intervention is implemented through mailed letters sent during
the first weeks of January, prior to the start of construction. The primary objective is to identify causal effects on tax compliance driven by information about public goods provision, distinguishing between general tax-benefit salience and personalized exposure based on distance to the infrastructure.
Intervention
The municipality is building the Túnel de Hornos, a large local infrastructure project financed through municipal revenues, and we partnered with the local government to inform property taxpayers about this tax–benefit link. We are mailing letters to the universe of roughly 100,000 property tax accounts that made the tunnel salient and explicitly connected it to funding from the property tax. The core variation is in framing and personalization: relative to a baseline letter with standard payment information, treatment letters highlight the tunnel as a municipal investment and emphasize the recipient’s geographic proximity to the project to make the individual benefit more concrete. We then measure how these informational frames affect compliance and payment behavior, and whether responses vary with distance to the tunnel.
--- AMMENDMENT - April 2026 - Survey
As a complement to the results of the physical letter experiment, we pre-register an online survey designed to identify the mechanisms behind the observed compliance effects. The survey targets approximately 15,000 taxpayers drawn from the subset of accounts that did not receive the physical letter. The survey embeds a randomized information treatment (3 arms):
- Control: No mention of the tunnel.
- T1: Informed about the tunnel construction, no financing mention.
- T2: Same as T1, plus explicit statement that the project is financed with municipal funds (TSG).
Pre-treatment questions measure satisfaction with municipal services, unconditional and conditional tax morale, and frequency of crossing the railway tracks (reciprocity proxy). The unconditional/conditional tax morale pair classifies respondents into civic-minded or not types, enabling heterogeneity analysis by taxpayer type. In the T1 and T2 arms, a prior awareness question about the tunnel is asked before the information treatment, allowing us to test whether effects differ between those already informed and those receiving new information. Post-treatment outcomes capture perceived service delivery, trust in spending, and conditional tax morale. Comparison of T1 vs T2 identifies the fiscal attribution channel; heterogeneity by railway crossing frequency and distance to the tunnel identifies reciprocity; treatment effects on service delivery beliefs. Survey respondents are linked to administrative tax records, additionally allowing us to test whether attitudinal shifts translate into behavioral changes in compliance in future payments. Distance heterogeneity is analyzed using the same bins as the letter experiment, enabling direct comparison of survey-based mechanism evidence with administrative compliance effects from the original intervention.
Experimental design
We will analyze treatment effects separately by distance to the tunnel, comparing taxpayers who are closer versus farther away (using pre-defined distance bins defined as 0-1.5km, 1.5-3km,3-5km,+5k. This heterogeneity is central because the intervention is explicitly about making the benefits of the project salient, and proximity is a natural proxy for expected individual benefit. If the tax–benefit linkage matters, effects should be stronger among those with higher exposure to the project (closer properties). At the same time, the sign is not mechanically pinned down: some taxpayers may react positively to learning that their taxes finance a visible local investment, while others may react negatively if they perceive the project as irrelevant, poorly targeted, or not worth the cost, even if they live nearby. We will also report pooled effects across all distances.
We will explore heterogeneity by baseline compliance (past payment history). We expect larger effects among taxpayers who have a margin to adjust, such as occasional or late payers, and smaller effects among never-payers and always-on-time payers. Never-payers may be less responsive to informational content because nonpayment is likely driven by constraints or persistent disengagement, while consistently compliant taxpayers have limited room to increase compliance.
Design details
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