Thinking Through Complexity
How to cite
Rasocha, Vlastimil; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Hartley, Jon. 2026. "Thinking Through Complexity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017632. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17632-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates how individuals reason in complex economic environments involving indirect and feedback effects. Participants in an online experiment take part in a “transfer game” with three fictitious players and a fixed set of rules that determine how money moves between players over two or three rounds. In each game, participants predict how many coins one player will end up with and earn a bonus based on prediction accuracy. A key feature of the design is that participants do not see the full set of transfer rules directly. Instead, they can consult a simple calculator that reveals the consequence of a specific transfer rule they choose to look up. By observing both participants’ predictions and the information they choose to look up, we study how people simplify complex environments by focusing on some effects and ignoring others, and how these simplifications depend on the complexity of the environment, information costs, and incentives for accuracy.
Experimental design
This study is an online lab experiment in which participants complete a “transfer game” prediction task. Each game involves three fictitious players (Blue, Red, Yellow) with bank accounts. Yellow starts with 100 coins and the other players start with 0. The game lasts either two or three rounds, depending on treatment. In each round, each player follows a rule that specifies how many coins they transfer to each of the other players, how many they keep, and how many they spend; the rules change by round.
Participants’ task is to predict how many coins will be in Blue’s account at the end of the game. Participants do not see the underlying rules directly. Instead, they can use a custom calculator that reveals the transfers implied by a specific rule they choose to look up (by selecting the round, sender, receiver, and a starting balance). We record participants’ final predictions and the complete history of their calculator look-ups.
The experiment uses a between-subject design with randomized variation in: (i) the number of rounds in the game (two vs. three), (ii) whether calculator look-ups are free or carry a small per-look-up cost, and (iii) the size of the accuracy-based bonus available for the prediction meaningfully. Participants complete multiple versions of the game in random order, and one is randomly selected for payment.
Design details
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