Millions of workers migrate for work across the globe. In LMICs, where many local labor markets witness high levels of unemployment, internal migration for work is prevalent. Standard economic theory argues that this is driven by reservation wage differences of migrant and local workers. This paper will try to understand a) whether firms prefer migrant workers compared to local workers at the same wage b) the drivers of these preferences.
Intervention
The primary goal of the project is to understand the drivers of firms' preference for migrant workers.
Experimental design
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Design details
Randomization method
Worker side: A Unique ID with treatment cells randomly allocated to them is created in the office. Enumerators recruit the workers in the order of unique id.
Firm side: The contract choice for firms will be randomly drawn in the office through a computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization on the worker is done at the individual level.
Workers and firms which accept contracts within a treatment cell are matched with each other randomly to each other.
Clusters
We will cluster at the individual level for the firms as we observe them hiring more than one workers, and because we offer them more than one contracts to hire workers on.
Observations
Our firm side sample will consist of 800 firms.
2000 workers, including local (800) and migrant (1200) workers.
There is a possibility that we might not be able to reach 2000 workers. Similarly, number of firms may be below 800.
Arms
On the worker side for migrants: Each worker (except pure control) will be offered two jobs one of which will always be Baseline Control.
Pure control 10%, Control off site (45%), Control On site (45%), Outside option On site (15%), Outside option off site (15%),
Monitoring On site (15%), Monitoring off site (15%), Insurance On site (15%), Insurance off site (15%)
On the worker side for local:
Control off site (50%), Outside option off site (25%), Monitoring off site (25%)
Firms:
Each firm will be offered all the different contracts, one of which will be randomly chosen and implemented.
Primary outcomes
1) Acceptance of contracts on the firm side. This will give us WTP.
2) Job acceptance (and the associated wages) on the worker side.
3) WTP to pay for different contract features on worker side.
4) Productivity of workers (no of hours worked, absenteeism etc) when they are matched with firms.
Secondary outcomes
Beliefs of firms about productivity and social vulnerability of local and migrant workers.
Beliefs of workers about productivity and social vulnerability for local and migrant workers.
Preference ordering of firms for the different menu of contracts.
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