Probabilistic Cash Rebates and Consumption Choices under Carbon Pricing

How to cite

Drichoutis, Andreas; Palma, Marco. 2026. "Probabilistic Cash Rebates and Consumption Choices under Carbon Pricing." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017601. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17601-4.0

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Andreas Drichoutis* , Marco Palma

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017601
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17601-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2026-04-01 – 2026-07-10
Countries
Private
JEL codes
Q48, Q50, Q58, C90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17601

Abstract

This study uses an online experiment to examine how consumers respond to different types of cash rebates linked to environmentally relevant consumption choices. Participants make repeated decisions about how many units of a product to purchase under a fixed price that reflects a carbon charge, with lower consumption associated with greater environmental benefits. We compare behavior under several treatments inlcuding a no rebate control, a guaranteed cash rebate, and several probabilistic rebate schemes that differ in the likelihood of rebate payment. The study is designed to assess whether probabilistic rebates generate similar behavioral responses to guaranteed rebates, and to examine whether responses vary systematically with the probability of receiving a rebate. This experiment constitutes a new study conducted in response to reviewer comments on a prior preregistration (AEARCTR-0015002, “Lottery incentives and carbon pricing rebates”).

Intervention

Participants take part in an online decision task in which they choose how many units of a product to purchase at a fixed price that reflects a carbon-related charge. Purchasing fewer units is associated with greater environmental benefits. Depending on the treatment group, participants may receive no cash rebate, a guaranteed cash rebate, or a cash rebate that is awarded with a specified probability. The size of the rebate is fixed, but the likelihood of receiving it varies across groups. Participants make decisions in four rounds and receive feedback about outcomes after each decision round, with one round randomly selected to determine their final payoff.

In a later amendment to the original five-arm design, we added a sixth treatment arm, the Neutral Pricing Benchmark, in which participants complete an otherwise identical purchase task with the same prices, values, feasible choice set, number of rounds, and payoff structure, but with no mention of carbon emissions, emissions retirement, or rebates.

Amendment: In addition to the original experimental arms, we add a supplemental data-collection wave focused exclusively on the 50% probabilistic rebate and 100% guaranteed rebate treatments. New participants in this wave will be randomized in equal proportions between these two treatments. The decision task, payoff structure, rebate amount, and CO₂-offset mapping are kept the same as in the original study.

Experimental design

The study uses a between-subjects experimental design with random assignment to one of five incentive conditions: no rebate, sure rebate, or a probabilistic rebate with a 50%, 25%, or 10% probability. Participants complete a sequence of four decision rounds. In each round, they choose how many units (0–4) of a fictitious consumption good to purchase at a fixed price. Each unit provides a privately induced monetary value to the participant, while consumption is associated with carbon emissions that can be offset by the researchers depending on participants' choices.

In rebate conditions, participants are informed that they may receive a monetary rebate linked to the number of units they choose not to consume. The structure of the rebate varies by treatment in terms of the probability with which it is paid. Participants receive feedback after each round about their own choices and the corresponding carbon offset. At the end of the experiment, one round is randomly selected to determine monetary payoffs.

Randomization is conducted at the individual level, and all participants face the same price, values, and decision environment aside from the rebate probability. The design allows comparison of choices across incentive conditions and across rounds within individuals.

In a later amendment, a sixth condition was added: the Neutral Pricing Benchmark.

Amendment: During peer review, a referee raised the concern that the absence of a statistically significant difference between the 50% and 100% rebate treatments should not be interpreted as equivalence, and that the existing comparison was underpowered to rule out small but meaningful differences. In response, we add a supplemental confirmatory non-inferiority analysis comparing the 50% probabilistic rebate to the 100% guaranteed rebate. This supplemental analysis does not replace the originally preregistered primary comparison between the 100% and 10% rebate treatments.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is implemented by the experimental software (Qualtrics or oTree). Participants are randomly assigned to one of the treatment conditions upon entering the study by the experimental software. For the supplemental wave, eligible participants will be randomized in equal proportions between the 50% probabilistic rebate and 100% guaranteed rebate treatments.
Randomization unit
Randomization is conducted at the individual participant level. Each participant is independently assigned to a treatment condition. There is no cluster-level or group-level randomization.
Clusters
Not applicable. Randomization is conducted at the individual participant level, and there are no clusters.
Observations
Planned Number of Observations: 1,140 individual participants * 4 rounds = 4,560. N = 1,012 is chosen to achieve 80% power at alpha=0.05 for the primary Sure vs 10% contrast with MDE=0.20 under the prespecified unequal allocation.
Arms
Neutral Pricing Benchmark (added in amendment): 104 participants No rebate (control): 104 participants Sure rebate (100%): 362 participants 50% rebate: 104 participants 25% rebate: 104 participants 10% rebate: 362 participants Total: 1,140 participants The supplemental wave targets 521 completed observations in the 50% rebate treatment and 521 completed observations in the 100% rebate treatment, for 1,042 new completed observations. Combined with the original completed observations, (n50_old=114) and (n100_old=378), the final pooled comparison will include 635 observations in the 50% rebate treatment and 899 observations in the 100% rebate treatment, for a total of 1,534 observations in the 50% versus 100% comparison.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is the number of units purchased in Round 1, Yi1 = {0,1,2,3,4}, treated as continuous. This measure also provides the participants desired level for the experimenters commitment to retire carbon emission allowances equivalent to 50 pounds of CO2 per unit not purchased. Supplemental primary outcome: number of units purchased in Round 4 in the 50% and 100% rebate treatments. This round-specific endpoint is used for the supplemental non-inferiority analysis because the original results and reviewer concern focused on whether the 50% rebate remains close to the 100% rebate after participants have gained experience with the repeated decision environment. Secondary supplemental outcomes include units purchased in Rounds 1–3 and the average number of units purchased across rounds.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include the average number of units purchased across all four rounds, Ybar_i = (1/4) * sum_{r=1}^4 Yir, the round-by-round choices Yir, and measures of dynamics such as Yi4 − Yi1.

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Keywords