Probabilistic Cash Rebates and Consumption Choices under Carbon Pricing
How to cite
Drichoutis, Andreas; Palma, Marco. 2026. "Probabilistic Cash Rebates and Consumption Choices under Carbon Pricing." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017601. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17601-4.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study uses an online experiment to examine how consumers respond to different types of cash rebates linked to environmentally relevant consumption choices. Participants make repeated decisions about how many units of a product to purchase under a fixed price that reflects a carbon charge, with lower consumption associated with greater environmental benefits. We compare behavior under several treatments inlcuding a no rebate control, a guaranteed cash rebate, and several probabilistic rebate schemes that differ in the likelihood of rebate payment. The study is designed to assess whether probabilistic rebates generate similar behavioral responses to guaranteed rebates, and to examine whether responses vary systematically with the probability of receiving a rebate. This experiment constitutes a new study conducted in response to reviewer comments on a prior preregistration (AEARCTR-0015002, “Lottery incentives and carbon pricing rebates”).
Intervention
Participants take part in an online decision task in which they choose how many units of a product to purchase at a fixed price that reflects a carbon-related charge. Purchasing fewer units is associated with greater environmental benefits. Depending on the treatment group, participants may receive no cash rebate, a guaranteed cash rebate, or a cash rebate that is awarded with a specified probability. The size of the rebate is fixed, but the likelihood of receiving it varies across groups. Participants make decisions in four rounds and receive feedback about outcomes after each decision round, with one round randomly selected to determine their final payoff.
In a later amendment to the original five-arm design, we added a sixth treatment arm, the Neutral Pricing Benchmark, in which participants complete an otherwise identical purchase task with the same prices, values, feasible choice set, number of rounds, and payoff structure, but with no mention of carbon emissions, emissions retirement, or rebates.
Amendment: In addition to the original experimental arms, we add a supplemental data-collection wave focused exclusively on the 50% probabilistic rebate and 100% guaranteed rebate treatments. New participants in this wave will be randomized in equal proportions between these two treatments. The decision task, payoff structure, rebate amount, and CO₂-offset mapping are kept the same as in the original study.
Experimental design
The study uses a between-subjects experimental design with random assignment to one of five incentive conditions: no rebate, sure rebate, or a probabilistic rebate with a 50%, 25%, or 10% probability. Participants complete a sequence of four decision rounds. In each round, they choose how many units (0–4) of a fictitious consumption good to purchase at a fixed price. Each unit provides a privately induced monetary value to the participant, while consumption is associated with carbon emissions that can be offset by the researchers depending on participants' choices.
In rebate conditions, participants are informed that they may receive a monetary rebate linked to the number of units they choose not to consume. The structure of the rebate varies by treatment in terms of the probability with which it is paid. Participants receive feedback after each round about their own choices and the corresponding carbon offset. At the end of the experiment, one round is randomly selected to determine monetary payoffs.
Randomization is conducted at the individual level, and all participants face the same price, values, and decision environment aside from the rebate probability. The design allows comparison of choices across incentive conditions and across rounds within individuals.
In a later amendment, a sixth condition was added: the Neutral Pricing Benchmark.
Amendment: During peer review, a referee raised the concern that the absence of a statistically significant difference between the 50% and 100% rebate treatments should not be interpreted as equivalence, and that the existing comparison was underpowered to rule out small but meaningful differences. In response, we add a supplemental confirmatory non-inferiority analysis comparing the 50% probabilistic rebate to the 100% guaranteed rebate. This supplemental analysis does not replace the originally preregistered primary comparison between the 100% and 10% rebate treatments.
Design details
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