Consumer Acceptance of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform

How to cite

Im, Jiwon; Kim, Booyeol; Choi, Syngjoo; Ki, Minji. 2025. "Consumer Acceptance of Residential Electricity Tariff Reform." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017557. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17557-1.0

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Jiwon Im* , Booyeol Kim , Syngjoo Choi , Minji Ki

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017557
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17557-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-12-22 – 2026-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93;Q48
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17557

Abstract

Persistent financial deficits in South Korea’s power sector necessitate residential electricity price normalization, yet public opposition acts as a binding constraint. This study investigates a novel behavioral mechanism underlying this resistance: the lack of instrumental agency. We hypothesize that consumer opposition stems not only from the price increase itself but from a rigid tariff structure that offers no actionable alternatives to mitigate cost shocks.
We implement two complementary randomized survey experiments using a nationally representative sample of 2,200 South Korean adults, stratified by age, gender, and region. First, to identify the causal drivers of reform acceptance, we employ a mixed experimental design. We elicit baseline acceptance of price increases (ex-ante) and compare it to acceptance after respondents are presented with an alternative tariff option (ex-post). The presentation of this alternative is randomized via a 2 by 2 factorial design, varying the default setting (opt-in vs. opt-out) and information framing (neutral vs. positive). This allows us to test whether choice architecture enhances tariff adoption and, by extension, increases the political feasibility of broader price reform.
Second, to inform structural policy design, the DCE elicits preferences for specific tariff attributes. We estimate trade-offs between short-run adoption incentives and long-run savings. Crucially, the design models an individual-specific "inertia range"—the cost-shock threshold required to induce switching—while varying the reference price baseline (current vs. +5% and +10% hikes) to identify reference-dependent preferences.
This study provides causal evidence on how providing consumer choice, optimized through defaults and framing, can mitigate resistance to energy price reforms. The findings offer actionable guidance for designing politically viable transitions in regulated energy markets.

Intervention

The study employs a sequential modular design consisting of two distinct components. To ensure that structural preferences are elicited without bias from choice-architecture interventions, respondents first complete a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), followed by a Randomized Decision-Structure Experiment.

[Intervention 1: Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)]
The DCE evaluates latent preferences for residential electricity tariff designs. We use a fractional factorial design to construct systematic choice sets. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of two blocks, each containing five choice tasks. In each task, participants choose between the status quo and hypothetical tariff profiles defined by five attributes:
1.Seasonality: Peak pricing season adjustments.
2.Time-of-Use (ToU) Structure: The specific configuration and frequency of peak vs. off-peak blocks.
3.Price Differential: The magnitude of the price ratio between peak and off-peak periods.
4.Adoption Incentive: Short-run monetary benefits provided upon switching.
5.Bill Variation: The expected change in the monthly bill, presented as percentage changes ranging from −10% to +10% relative to the respondent’s self-reported baseline.
Across respondents, the reference option (the status quo against which alternatives are compared) is randomized at three levels to test for reference dependence: current progressive tariff, current tariff +5% increase, and current tariff +10% increase. The magnitude of the price ratio between peak and off-peak periods. Additionally, we elicit the "inertia range"—the specific bill-increase threshold below which a respondent remains passive (i.e., would not alter consumption or switch tariffs).

[Intervention 2: Decision-Structure and Information Experiment]
Following the DCE, we implement a 2 by 2 between-subjects factorial design embedded within a within-respondent pre-post design. This component identifies how choice architecture influences the acceptance of price normalization.
1.Baseline (Ex-ante): We measure the respondent's baseline acceptance of a general electricity price increase on a Likert scale of 10, without offering any mitigating alternatives.
2.Randomized Intervention: respondents are offered a specific alternative tariff option. They are randomly assigned to one of four treatment arms, varying by Default Setting (Opt-in vs. Opt-out) and Information Framing (Neutral vs. Positive):
-T1 (Control, Opt-in): Participant must actively switch; neutral description.
-T2 (Control, Opt-out): Alternative is set as the default; neutral description.
-T3 (Treatment, Opt-in): Participant must actively switch; framing emphasizes recommendations and system efficiency.
-T4 (Treatment, Opt-out): Alternative is set as the default; framing emphasizes social norms and economic rationality.
3.Post-Treatment (Ex-post): We re-measure the respondent's acceptance of the general price increase. This allows us to calculate the acceptance increase due to the causal effect of providing choice, defaults, and framing on the political feasibility of price reform.

Experimental design

This study employs a sequential experimental design comprising two integrated modules: a discrete choice experiment followed by a decision-structure experiment, using a nationally representative sample of 2,200 adults in South Korea. We utilize a nationally representative sample of 2,200 South Korean adults, recruited via a professional survey firm and stratified by age, gender, and geographic region.

[Module 1: Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE)]
In the first module, participants complete a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) designed to elicit structural preferences over alternative residential electricity pricing schemes. The DCE consists of 10 choice sets generated via a fractional factorial design to maximize statistical efficiency while maintaining orthogonality. To minimize cognitive burden, participants are randomly assigned to one of two blocks, completing five binary choice tasks each. Each choice task presents two alternative pricing profiles that vary systematically across five attributes: seasonality, structure, price differential, adoption incentive, and bill variation. Crucially, the expected monthly bill change attribute is personalized for each participant. It is dynamically pivoted based on the respondent’s self-reported average monthly electricity bill and presented as a percentage change within a predefined range (e.g., -10% to +10%). This design feature ensures that the trade-offs presented are financially salient and realistic for each household.

[Module 2: Decision-Structure and Information Experiment]
This module constitutes the core RCT testing the drivers of policy acceptance. Participants are randomly assigned at the individual level to one of four experimental groups in a 2 by 2 between-subjects factorial design, varying decision structure (opt-in vs. opt-out default) and information framing (neutral vs. positively framed information). All participants first report their baseline acceptance of residential electricity price increases in the absence of any alternative pricing option. Participants are then exposed to an alternative electricity pricing scheme under their assigned decision-structure and information condition and report post-intervention acceptance. Treatment effects are identified through changes in acceptance between the pre- and post-intervention measures and comparisons across experimental groups.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer-based stratified is implemented via the online survey platform’s algorithm. To ensure covariate balance across the four experimental arms, the randomization sequence is stratified by key demographic characteristics. Specifically, the algorithm balances the sample based on gender, region of residence, and age groups. Within each stratum, respondents are independently assigned to one of the four treatment conditions with equal probability.
Randomization unit
Individual. Randomization occurs at the level of the individual survey respondent, conditional on the demographic strata defined by age, gender, and region.
Clusters
N/A. individual level randomization
Observations
2,200 individual adults’ participants
Arms
The target sample size is N = 2,200, providing approximately 550 participants per arm. This sample size is powered to detect small-to-moderate treatment effects in both the adoption rates and the shift in Likert-scale acceptance. - Control opt-in (approximately 550 participants) - Control opt-out (approximately 550 participants) - Treatment opt-in (approximately 550 participants) - Treatment opt-out (approximately 550 participants) Stratified randomization is employed to ensure balanced representation of age groups, gender, and regional residence across all four arms. All 2,200 participants in the main sample also complete the DCE module.
Primary outcomes
[Discrete Choice Experiment: Tariff Choice Behavior] The primary outcome of the discrete choice experiment is individual tariff choice behavior, recorded as a binary indicator across paired choice tasks. Using conditional and mixed logit specifications, we utilize these choices to estimate the marginal utility weights of key tariff attributes, specifically identifying the trade-offs consumers make between short-run adoption incentives and longer-run expected monthly bill stability. [Decision-Structure and Information Experiment: Acceptance Lift] The primary outcome is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on the change in stated acceptance of electricity price normalization. This is measured as the within-subject difference on a 10-point Likert scale. This measure identifies the "Acceptance Lift" generated by the introduction of an actionable alternative, directly testing the hypothesis that instrumental agency reduces the political cost of reform.
Secondary outcomes
[Discrete Choice Experiment: Structural Parameters] We will estimate consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for specific tariff attributes (e.g., the premium consumers are willing to pay for reduced seasonality). We will also examine inertial thresholds by measuring the degree of status-quo stickiness. Specifically, we identify an inertia range—defined as the interval of bill increases over which the probability of switching remains statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally, we assess reference dependence by analyzing shifts in choice probabilities conditional on randomized reference baselines (status quo, +5%, or +10% bill increases). [Decision-Structure and Information Experiment: Behavioral Mechanisms] For the decision-structure experiment, secondary outcomes capture the mechanisms of behavioral response. First, we measure the tariff adoption rate, the binary outcome of whether the respondent "signs up" for the alternative tariff under the assigned condition (T1–T4). This measures the power of defaults (opt-out) versus active choice (opt-in). Second, we calculate the proportion of respondents who shift from opposition (baseline) to support (post-intervention). The proportion of "Reform Opponents" (defined as baseline scores ≤ 4) who transition to "Reform Supporters" (post-intervention scores ≥ 6). This distinguishes between marginal shifts in opinion and categorical changes in political stance.

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