Efficiency and Rent Seeking in Local Government in India
How to cite
Fischer, Greg; Duflo, Esther; Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra. 2017. "Efficiency and Rent Seeking in Local Government in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001753. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1753-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
One of the traditional trade-offs about whether local public good provision should be decentralized is between efficiency and rent seeking: decentralized governments may be better at eliciting people’s preferences than a centralized government, but they may have a higher chance to be captured by local elites and politically powerful groups. This paper seeks to shed light to this debate by answering several related questions, in the context of the decentralization in India. First, are mandated representation effective at increasing the share of public goods that reach minorities in a decentralized government?1 Second, does the allocation of public goods appear to be efficient in a local government? In other words, even if minorities are disadvantaged, are they getting the mix of goods that they want? Third, is there evidence that powerful groups are getting more public goods than weak groups? And is there evidence that the elected officials take advantage of their position to provide more goods to their own constituencies?
Intervention
The Indian government randomly assigned Gram Panchayat ("GP," local village councils) to reserve a fraction of all positions of chief to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This yields two types of local village councils:
1) Councils where GP positions were reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes
2) Councils where GP positions were unreserved
Experimental design
In 1993, an amendment to the constitution of India ordered the States both to devolve more power over expenditure to local village councils (Gram Panchayat, henceforth GP) and to reserved a fraction of all positions of chief (Pradhan) to scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) in proportion to their representation in the population. The seats to be reserved were randomly chosen. We conducted a detailed survey of all investments in local public goods in a sample of villages in Birbhum, in West Bengal, including information on the location of the public goods (the village within the GP, and the hamlet within the village). Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, religious minorities, and other groups, live in segregated hamlets, and many public goods (such as wells, are useful locally). We are thus able to estimate whether scheduled castes Pradhans tend to put more goods in scheduled castes hamlets, whether they change the mix of public goods provided in the villages, and whether they change the mix of goods available in scheduled castes hamlets. Because reserved constituencies were randomly assigned, we can confidently attribute any difference between the location or the types of public goods to the reservations policy.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Duflo, Esther, Greg Fischer, and Raghabendra Chattopadhyay. "Efficiency and Rent Seeking in Local Government: Evidence from Randomized Policy Experiments in India." Working Paper, MIT, February 28, 2005. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/107_Duflo_Efficiency_and_Rent_Seeking.pdf
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