The Impact of Job Search Requirements and the Salience of Monitoring and Sanctions: Evidence from Integration Agreements for Job Seekers in France

How to cite

Geuna, Pietro; Uhlendorff, Arne; Rain, Audrey; Breda, Thomas; Briand, Lucie; Berg, Gerard Van den. 2026. "The Impact of Job Search Requirements and the Salience of Monitoring and Sanctions: Evidence from Integration Agreements for Job Seekers in France." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017471. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17471-1.1

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Pietro Geuna* , Arne Uhlendorff , Audrey Rain , Thomas Breda , Lucie Briand , Gerard Van den Berg

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017471
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17471-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-11-01 – 2028-03-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J65, J64, J68, C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17471

Abstract

Integration agreements between job seekers and public employment services define mutual obligations for labor market integration, including job search requirements and the conditions under which compliance is monitored and sanctioned. We study how the content and framing of these agreements affect job search behavior and labor market outcomes in the context of the French “Contrat d'Engagement” (Engagement Contract), a mandatory integration agreement signed by job seekers and caseworkers upon registration with the French public employment service, France Travail. The agreement includes a personalized action plan specifying activities to support labor market integration.

We implement a large-scale experiment across all France Travail agencies. We randomize agencies into three treatment arms and one control group. Each treatment arm modifies the instructions provided to caseworkers when preparing integration agreements with job seekers. Caseworkers in treated agencies receive digital toolkits that either (1) encourage setting a precise quantitative target for the minimum number of job applications supposed to be submitted by the job seeker, (2) provide scripted talking points to explicitly discuss monitoring procedures and potential sanctions, or (3) combine both interventions. Agencies in the control group follow standard procedures.

Using administrative data from France Travail and surveys of job seekers and caseworkers, we measure effects on job search behavior and employment outcomes.

Intervention

The intervention is implemented through the internal case management software used by caseworkers of the French public employment service (France Travail) during meetings with registered job seekers. During these meetings, caseworkers prepare the Contrat d’Engagement (Engagement Contract), which is then signed by both the caseworker and the job seeker. The contract is an integration agreement that specifies commitments of both the job seeker and the caseworker, including the actions the job seeker agrees to undertake to support labor market integration.

Depending on the treatment arm, caseworkers encounter specific banners in the software prompting them to emphasize different aspects of the contract. These prompts either encourage the caseworker to set a precise individual specific quantitative target for the number of job applications to be submitted by the job seekers, or to explicitly discuss monitoring procedures and potential sanctions for non-compliance. In addition, caseworkers in treated agencies receive a digital toolkit containing guidance and suggesting talking points, accessible through links embedded in the software banners.

Experimental design

The experiment is based on a randomization at the agency level. A total of 882 France Travail agencies are randomly assigned with equal probability to one of three treatment arms or to a control group. Caseworkers in treated agencies receive digital toolkits containing guidance and talking points corresponding to their agency’s treatment assignment.

The four groups are:

Treatment Arm 1 — Target Setting: The software displays a banner prompting the caseworker to establish and record a specific quantitative target in the job seeker's action plan, most notably a minimum number of job applications. The banner also contains a link to a toolkit. This toolkit provides guidance on how to define an appropriate target and clarifies what is expected from caseworkers.

Treatment Arm 2 — Monitoring Transparency: The software displays a banner prompting the caseworker to explicitly explain the monitoring procedures and potential sanctions associated with the job seeker's obligations. The banner also contains a link to a toolkit. This toolkit provides suggested talking points on obligations and sanctions.

Treatment Arm 3 — Combined Treatment: Caseworkers receive both the Target Setting and the Monitoring Transparency prompts, along with the corresponding toolkits.

Control Group: No banner or toolkit is provided. Caseworkers follow standard procedures.

This design allows us to separately estimate the causal effects of the two treatments (Target Setting and Monitoring Transparency), and also to detect potential interaction effects between the two treatments.

Our main sample consists of jobseekers who had no previous contact with France Travail in the 6 months before their current registration, and who sign a contract in the first four months after their registration. The overall inflow sample will consist of 9 monthly cohorts of newly registered job seekers. We will measure outcomes for this target group based on administrative data and based on two surveys. The first survey will be conducted around one month after signing the integration agreement. The second survey will be conducted around six months after signing the integration agreement. For both surveys, we target a sample size of around 40.000 completed interviews.

Although outside of our main analysis sample, our treatment will also affect job seekers registered at France Travail who do not meet the sample selection criteria and who sign an integration agreement during the timeframe of our experiment. We will explore effects of the different treatments for this group based on administrative data in a secondary set of analyses.

Design details

Randomization method
For randomization, we employ a recursive matching procedure implemented in R (nbpMatching). All participating agencies are first separated into Mainland France and Overseas territories. The mainland agencies are grouped into blocks of eight based on similarity across three administrative variables observed over the preceding year: the average monthly inflow of new jobseekers eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, the average employment rate six months after registration for this inflow, and the inflow of jobseekers eligible for welfare benefits (RSA - Revenu de Solidarité Active- beneficiaries). Overseas territory agencies are grouped into blocks of eight based on the inflow of jobseekers eligible for welfare benefits. Within each block, two agencies are allocated randomly to each treatment arm. Those agencies which are not assigned to a block due to missing values, or which were left out to reach a multiple of eight, are randomly allocated to the either one of the treatment groups or the control group using the statistical software R.
Randomization unit
The experiment is clustered at the agency level.
Clusters
882 France Travail employment agencies.
Observations
We expect a monthly inflow of around 100.000 job seekers signing a new integration agreement. This will lead to a total number of around 900.000 job seekers.
Arms
Target Setting: around 220 agencies with overall around 225.000 job seekers Monitoring Transparency: around 220 overall agencies with around 225.000 job seekers Combined: around 220 agencies with overall around 225.000 job seekers Control: around 220 agencies with overall around 225.000 job seekers
Primary outcomes
(1) Leaving unemployment for work (2) Employment rates (3) Number of job applications
Secondary outcomes
(1) Reservation Wage (2) Search Effort (time) (3) Earnings (4) Type of employment contract (5) Sectoral and occupational mobility

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Keywords