Human-Algorithm Interaction in the Centipede Game: an Experiment

How to cite

Bigoni, Maria; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Rovatti, Riccardo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo. 2025. "Human-Algorithm Interaction in the Centipede Game: an Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017448. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17448-1.0

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Maria Bigoni* , Giacomo Calzolari , Vincenzo Denicolò , Riccardo Rovatti , Giancarlo Spagnolo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017448
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17448-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-12-15 – 2026-04-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D91
Secondary IDs
C92, C72
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17448

Abstract

This study investigates how humans and algorithmic agents interact in a dynamic social dilemma environment based on two variants (standard and equalized) of the Centipede game, building on prior evidence that strategic reasoning and beliefs shape cooperation outcomes. We conduct an online longitudinal experiment in which participants repeatedly revise and deploy strategies while interacting either with other humans or with an algorithmic opponent. The design allows us to examine how patterns of cooperation, decision rules, and beliefs evolve over time and how they differ across game structures and opponent types. The study aims to provide systematic evidence on the behavioral consequences of introducing algorithmic agents into strategic environments traditionally studied with human participants.

Intervention

Participants take part in an online experiment involving repeated strategic interactions in variants of the Centipede game. They are asked to specify strategies and make choices in a series of decision tasks. Some participants interact with other human players, while others interact with an algorithmic opponent. The study observes how decisions and beliefs evolve across multiple rounds, taking place during five subsequent days.

Experimental design

The study employs an online experimental design with repeated interactions in a centipede game. Participants are assigned to treatments that vary only in game structure and opponent type. They provide strategies over multiple rounds, enabling the study of how behavior changes with experience. Outcomes of interest include decision patterns and cooperation levels under different interaction conditions.

Design details

Randomization method
Participants in Experiment 2 are randomly allocated to roles and treatments at the beginning of day 1 by Prolific, the platform we use to recruit participants. They are randomly allocated to matching groups in day 1, through a procedure embedded in the experimental software, developed in oTree.
Randomization unit
Individual.
Clusters
We plan to have 17 matching groups (clusters) per treatment, for a total of 6 treatments and 102 matching groups.
Observations
1360, which results from - 17 matching groups of 20 participants in the Human-Human treatment with standard payoffs - 17 matching groups of 20 participants in the Human-Human treatment with equalized payoffs - 17 matching groups of 10 participants in the Human-Algorithm treatment with standard payoffs (Algorithm in the role of second mover) - 17 matching groups of 10 participants in the Human-Algorithm treatment with equalized payoffs (Algorithm in the role of second mover) - 17 matching groups of 10 participants in the Algorithm-Human treatment with standard payoffs (Algorithm in the role of first mover) - 17 matching groups of 10 participants in the Algorithm-Human treatment with equalized payoffs (Algorithm in the role of first mover)
Arms
17 matching groups per treatment
Primary outcomes
Realized efficiency at the matching-group/day level.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include individual choice patterns, belief reports, and derived measures of strategic sophistication (e.g., indicators of nonstrategic versus strategic reasoning). These outcomes characterize how participants’ decision rules and expectations evolve across rounds and how they differ across treatments.

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Keywords