The Political Economy of Progressive Air Travel Taxation

How to cite

Matejko, Leonie; Andor, Mark A.; Kramm, Michael. 2025. "The Political Economy of Progressive Air Travel Taxation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017438. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17438-1.0

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Leonie Matejko* , Mark A. Andor , Michael Kramm

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017438
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17438-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-12-11 – 2027-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H23, D83, C91, Q54
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17438

Abstract

Negative externalities such as those generated by air travel are typically addressed through linear Pigouvian taxes, yet these instruments are often set below optimal levels, face low public acceptability, and generate fairness concerns. Nonlinear progressive externality taxes, such as frequent flying levies, in which the marginal tax rate increases with the level of externality-generating activity, may improve both efficiency and political support. In this study, we examine public support for the linear versus progressive taxation of flights using a survey experiment with 9,000 participants from the general population in the United States, Germany, and Spain. In an information treatment, we provide respondents with information on the distribution of flights in their respective country and their position within them. We then examine the effects of this information on support for progressive taxation as well as its perceived fairness. We also study how these responses vary according to individuals' accuracy in estimating their flight consumption rank, as well as the direction of their potential misperceptions. To contrast progressive designs with alternative nonlinear schemes, we repeat this experimental design using a regressive tax schedule.

Intervention

See PAP

Experimental design

In this study, we examine public support for linear versus nonlinear taxation of air travel using a survey experiment among a general population sample of 9,000 respondents from the United States, Germany, and Spain. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions that vary along two dimensions: the type of nonlinear taxation (progressive or regressive) and whether respondents receive information about the distribution of annual flights in their country and their own position within that distribution. The information treatment is identical across progressive and regressive conditions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by the survey institute commissioned to conduct the survey
Randomization unit
Individuals (respondents)
Clusters
9,000 individuals (3,000 each from the US, Germany and Spain)
Observations
9,000 individuals (3,000 each from the US, Germany and Spain)
Arms
2,250 per treatment in the full sample, 750 per treatment each in the US, Germany and Spain
Primary outcomes
Policy preferences for nonlinear vs. linear taxation, perceived fairness of nonlinear vs. linear taxation

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords