Anticipated Discrimination and Gender Stereotypes in Job Applications
How to cite
Hilweg-Waldeck, Michael; Zednik, Anita; O'Leary, Ethan; Caputo, Roberto. 2025. "Anticipated Discrimination and Gender Stereotypes in Job Applications." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017372. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17372-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A well-established literature documents that women are, on average, less likely than men to enter competitive environments. This gender gap may be exacerbated by beliefs about biased evaluation of competitive performance. Most existing experimental studies documenting gender differences in competition entry assume that performance is evaluated objectively based on a measurable ranking. However, in many real labour-market settings, evaluation is to some extend subjective and carried out by human assessors who may hold stereotypes or exhibit biases. Such subjectivity can generate anticipated discrimination, which may further distort competition-entry decisions.
This project studies how anticipated discrimination and stereotype accommodation shape individuals’ willingness to enter competitive selection processes. Using an online experiment, we vary (i) whether the gender of candidates and evaluators is visible, (ii) whether evaluation is made by a single assessor or involves coordination between multiple evaluators, and (iii) whether the underlying task is stereotypically male or female. These manipulations allow us to isolate the roles of anticipated discrimination, evaluator bias, and job stereotypicality in explaining gender differences in competition entry. The study contributes to understanding how subjective evaluation in hiring may not only affect assessors’ decisions but also influence who chooses to apply in the first place.
Experimental design
Participants in our experiment will work in either of three roles: workers, managers, or recruiters.
Workers have to complete several rounds of real-effort task under varying payment schemes and difficulty. They then have to choose one of two payment schemes for a final round of play. Depending on their choice, they receive a fixed payment per point to score, or a higher payment per score conditional on another participant's decision.
Managers see several sets of workers and ability signals of theirs. For each set of workers separately, they then have to select one worker that they hire. If they hire the best-performing worker, they receive a bonus payment.
Recruiters see the same sets of workers and their ability signals as managers. For each such set, they then have to anticipate the Manager's decision on whom to select. If they are successful in this, they receive a bonus payment.
Design details
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