Bargaining and Deadlines

How to cite

Siegenthaler, Simon; Bochet, Olivier; Khanna, Manshu. 2025. "Bargaining and Deadlines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017367. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17367-1.0

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Simon Siegenthaler* , Olivier Bochet , Manshu Khanna

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017367
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17367-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-12-10 – 2026-03-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17367

Abstract

This laboratory experiment studies how deadline uncertainty and payoff discounting over time affect bargaining outcomes in bilateral negotiations. In each round, a buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object with privately or publicly known valuations and costs. The negotiation is subject to a deadline that is either fixed at 90 seconds or realized uniformly in an interval between 90 and 90 + x seconds, where x ∈ {2,4,8,16}. We implement a 2×2 between-subjects design varying (i) information (private vs. complete information about valuations and costs) and (ii) the presence of a small continuous discount factor applied to payoffs over negotiation time. Each treatment includes 20 bargaining rounds with random rematching within fixed matching groups of 16 subjects. Our primary outcomes are impasse rates and the timing of agreements.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of a laboratory bargaining task in which subjects are randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller and remain in that role throughout the session. Within each treatment, subjects are placed in fixed matching groups of sixteen participants and engage in twenty rounds of bilateral bargaining, being randomly re-matched with a new partner in every round. In each round, a buyer’s valuation and a seller’s cost are drawn independently from known distributions, and the pair negotiates over the price until either an agreement is reached or the deadline expires. We vary two factors between subjects: whether valuations and costs are private or commonly known, and whether payoffs are discounted continuously over negotiation time. Within each session, we also vary the degree of deadline uncertainty by randomly assigning rounds with different possible realizations of the deadline. All interactions take place through a computer interface, and participants receive monetary payoffs based on their decisions and bargaining outcomes. The design, procedures, and incentives are identical across treatments except for the pre-specified variations described above.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects are recruited through LINEEX and assigned to sessions by the laboratory using their standard randomized invitation procedure. Once in the lab, all within-experiment randomization—including the draws of valuations and costs, the assignment of deadline-uncertainty conditions across rounds, and the random re-matching of bargaining partners is carried out automatically by the experimental software.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the individual subject. Subjects are invited to sessions independently, and all within-experiment randomization—valuations and costs, re-matching of bargaining partners, and the sequence of deadline-uncertainty conditions—is implemented at the individual level by the software.
Clusters
24 matching groups (6 matching groups per treatment, each consisting of 16 subjects).
Observations
384 subjects in total (96 subjects per treatment).
Arms
96 subjects per treatment arm: 96 in Private Information / No Discount, 96 in Complete Information / No Discount, 96 in Private Information / Discount, and 96 in Complete Information / Discount.
Primary outcomes
Impasse indicator. Unit: pair–round. Definition: 1 if no agreement is reached before the realized deadline; 0 otherwise. Agreement time Unit: pair–round. Definition: number of seconds between the start of the round and the moment an offer is accepted. For rounds without agreement, we will treat agreement time as missing for primary analyses of timing (and separately analyze censoring). Opening offer gap. Unit: pair-round. Definition: difference between initial buyer offer and seller demand.

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Keywords