Bargaining and Deadlines
How to cite
Siegenthaler, Simon; Bochet, Olivier; Khanna, Manshu. 2025. "Bargaining and Deadlines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017367. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17367-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This laboratory experiment studies how deadline uncertainty and payoff discounting over time affect bargaining outcomes in bilateral negotiations. In each round, a buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object with privately or publicly known valuations and costs. The negotiation is subject to a deadline that is either fixed at 90 seconds or realized uniformly in an interval between 90 and 90 + x seconds, where x ∈ {2,4,8,16}. We implement a 2×2 between-subjects design varying (i) information (private vs. complete information about valuations and costs) and (ii) the presence of a small continuous discount factor applied to payoffs over negotiation time. Each treatment includes 20 bargaining rounds with random rematching within fixed matching groups of 16 subjects. Our primary outcomes are impasse rates and the timing of agreements.
Experimental design
The experiment consists of a laboratory bargaining task in which subjects are randomly assigned to the role of buyer or seller and remain in that role throughout the session. Within each treatment, subjects are placed in fixed matching groups of sixteen participants and engage in twenty rounds of bilateral bargaining, being randomly re-matched with a new partner in every round. In each round, a buyer’s valuation and a seller’s cost are drawn independently from known distributions, and the pair negotiates over the price until either an agreement is reached or the deadline expires. We vary two factors between subjects: whether valuations and costs are private or commonly known, and whether payoffs are discounted continuously over negotiation time. Within each session, we also vary the degree of deadline uncertainty by randomly assigning rounds with different possible realizations of the deadline. All interactions take place through a computer interface, and participants receive monetary payoffs based on their decisions and bargaining outcomes. The design, procedures, and incentives are identical across treatments except for the pre-specified variations described above.
Design details
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