Current Inequality, Future Prospects, and Trust: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
How to cite
Stringhi, Alessandro; Stimolo, Marco. 2025. "Current Inequality, Future Prospects, and Trust: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017352. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17352-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper compares two stylized environments in a pre-registered experiment based on a Trust Mini Game played over two independent periods. One environment features a smaller current endowment gap, implemented in the Low Inequality treatment. The other features better ex ante prospects under unchanged current inequality, implemented in the Rank Reversal treatment, where a Poor receiver may become Rich in period 2, and vice versa. The two treatments are calibrated to imply the same expected dispersion of endowments across the two periods of the game. We therefore focus on whether first-period behavior responds more strongly to a smaller current gap or to better prospects ex ante, before any rank reversal is realized.
Intervention
Between-subjects design based on a trust mini-game with dichotomous actions and heterogeneous endowments. Senders hold a median endowment (“Middle Class”), while Receivers hold either a lower (“Poor”) or higher (“Rich”) endowment relative to Senders. The trust mini-game is repeated in two blocks of 10 periods each. The design employs three treatments, in which the dispersion of the endowment distribution is manipulated (see Instructions for further details).
High Inequality (T0). In the first treatment, both blocks maintain high levels of endowment inequality. This setting represents a control condition with a symmetric but highly dispersed endowment distribution. The difference between “Rich” and “Poor” Receivers and the “Middle-class” Sender is equal to ±4 ECUs.
Low Inequality (T1). In the second treatment, endowment inequality in both blocks is halved compared to T0. The endowment distribution becomes less dispersed, with the difference between “Rich” and “Poor” Receivers and the “Middle-class” Sender reduced to ±2 ECUs.
Rank Reversal (T2). In the third treatment, the level of inequality within each block matches T0, but at the beginning of the second block there is a 50% chance of rank reversal for Receivers: half of the “Poor” become “Rich”, and half of the “Rich” become “Poor”. The expected individual endowment across blocks matches that of T1, resulting in a lower average dispersion of the endowment distribution compared to T0.
Experimental design
The experiment is conducted in the lab using oTreeg. Participants are assigned to one of three between-subjects treatments (T0: High Inequality, T1: Low Inequality, T2: Rank Reversal) and randomly to one of two roles, which remain fixed throughout: role A (“Middle-class” Sender) and role B (Receiver).
In each treatment, role-A participants receive a fixed endowment of 6 tokens in every period. Role-B participants are evenly split into a Low and a High endowment bracket. In T0 and T2, these brackets are (2, 10) tokens; in T1 they are (4, 8) tokens. The experiment consists of two blocks of 10 periods each (20 periods total). In every period, each A is randomly and anonymously matched with a B, under a typed-stranger protocol such that the same A–B pair does not meet more than once within a block. A is informed whether the matched B is Low or High; each participant knows their own endowment and the payoff structure.
In each period, A chooses between Stop and Continue, and B simultaneously chooses between Take and Share. If A chooses Stop, both players earn their initial endowment for that period. If A chooses Continue and B chooses Share, A’s payoff is twice A’s initial endowment (12 tokens) and B’s payoff is twice B’s initial endowment (treatment- and bracket-specific). If A chooses Continue and B chooses Take, A earns 0 tokens, while B earns twice their initial endowment plus 2 tokens. Apart from the endowment levels, the game structure is identical across treatments. The only additional difference is that in T2, between block 1 and block 2, 50% of Low-B participants are randomly reassigned to the High bracket and 50% of High-B participants to the Low bracket; in T0 and T1, brackets are fixed across blocks.
In each period, while making the action decision, A also reports a first-order belief (0–5) about how many B participants in the same bracket as the B they are currently paired with (i.e., “Poor” or “Rich”) will choose Share in that period. B reports a second-order belief (0–5) guessing the estimate made by the matched A in that period. At the end of the experiment, one period from each block is randomly selected for payment of choice-based earnings, and beliefs are additionally incentivized with a fixed payment per correct report.
Design details
Materials
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