A Low-Cost Signal: Evidence on Skill Certification and Migrant Labor Market Integration

How to cite

Werf, Cynthia Van Der; Busso, Matias; Gonzales-Velosa, Carolina; Muñoz-Morales, Juan Sebastian; Ruiz, Juanita. 2025. "A Low-Cost Signal: Evidence on Skill Certification and Migrant Labor Market Integration." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017294. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17294-1.0

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Cynthia Van Der Werf* , Matias Busso , Carolina Gonzales-Velosa , Juan Sebastian Muñoz-Morales , Juanita Ruiz

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017294
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17294-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-11-24 – 2027-02-28
Countries
Private
JEL codes
J24, J61, J64, I26, O15, D82.
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17294

Abstract

Labor markets in low- and middle-income countries face significant information frictions that weaken job matching. These frictions are particularly acute for migrants because employers often lack reliable signals of their skills, receive no references that help verify experience, and struggle to interpret foreign education credentials. Competency-based skill certification offers a direct way to address these barriers by providing verifiable information on workers’ abilities and encouraging firms to consider candidates they might otherwise overlook. We study Talentos que Impulsan (TQI), a certification program implemented with Colombia’s National Learning Service (SENA) that assesses and validates workers’ skills. Participation in the program is randomly assigned, allocating slots to migrants and locals across five major cities. Leveraging this design, we estimate certification's effects on labor market outcomes and mental well-being. Because this intervention reduces per-participant costs by more than half relative to incentive-based certification models in the same context, it provides a unique opportunity to evaluate a highly scalable alternative. The absence of financial incentives further enables us to isolate the returns to pure signaling, separate from impacts driven by monetary support. Our findings will contribute evidence on the role of low-cost certification in improving labor-market signaling, advancing migrant labor-market integration, and informing the design of scalable employment policies in resource-constrained settings.

Experimental design

Talentos que Impulsan (TQI) is a competency-based skill certification program implemented by Colombia’s National Learning Service (SENA) in collaboration with the Ministry of Labor. The program aims to certify approximately one thousand Colombian and migrant workers and provides guidance on how to register for and use the public employment services platform. TQI offers no monetary incentives and follows SENA’s standard assessment model, in which trained evaluators verify whether participants meet occupational competency standards.

The program targets vulnerable workers. Applicants must meet at least one criterion of vulnerability, and at least 30 percent of certification slots are reserved for migrants with regular legal status. Applicants enroll online, undergo eligibility screening, and then enter a randomized selection process when demand exceeds available slots. Randomization is stratified by nationality and competency area. Individuals selected for certification form the treatment group, and eligible non-selected applicants form the control group.

TQI certifies skills in five areas: health services, food processing, security, logistics, and sales. The evaluation covers five cities: Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali, Popayán, and Cúcuta. The intervention will occur in two waves: December 2025–January 2026 and February–March 2026. Certified participants receive an official SENA credential; those who do not pass may enroll in a gap-closure training program.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization was performed by an algorithm that stratified by competence level, migrant status.
Randomization unit
Randomization into the program was performed at the individual level. The randomization was stratified at the competence level and migrant status.
Clusters
We do not have a cluster-adjusted randomization.
Observations
This study includes a total of 2,200 individuals. Out of these, half will be randomly selected to receive the treatment (i.e., the skills evaluations and, if aproved, the certifications). The remaining half will be assigned to the control group. The sample is stratified by migrant status and at least 30% of the beneficiaries selected into treatment will be migrants.
Arms
The randomization is performed at the individual level. This means that the total sample size is equivalent to 2,200 individuals, where at least 40% of the sample will be treated.
Primary outcomes
The primary outcomes focus on labor market integration. We will measure: 1) Employment - Extensive margin: employment status - Intensive margin: hours worked 2) Earnings - Monthly wages / labor income
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes will be collected conditional on response rates observed during the pilot follow-up. If questionnaire length risks increasing attrition, only primary outcomes will be retained. 1) Labor Market Outcomes - Probability of pursuing additional education or training after the program - Probability of formal employment - Firm size (among employed individuals) - Economic sector of the employer - Occupational category (support staff, administrative, operator, etc.) - Desire to switch jobs (conditional on being employed) - Job satisfaction - Duration of unemployment spells (for unemployed respondents) - Reservation wage (minimum acceptable salary to switch jobs) - Maximum expected salary - Actual use of the certification signal in job-search activities 2) Mental Health -Symptoms of anxiety and depression (PHQ-9) -Stress levels -Self-efficacy and perceived ability to achieve goals 3) Measures of Poverty / Economic Hardship -Probability of skipping meals due to lack of economic resources 4) Perceptions of the Program -Willingness to pay for skill certification -Willingness to participate in the program without subsidies -Perceived impact of subsidies on program attractiveness

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Keywords