Community Participation, Targeting Performance, and Administrative Capture in Community-Based Targeting: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia
How to cite
Abay, Kibrom; Nigus, Halefom; Meles, Tensay. 2025. "Community Participation, Targeting Performance, and Administrative Capture in Community-Based Targeting: Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017238. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17238-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Despite the widespread use of community-based targeting (CBT) to identify beneficiaries of social assistance programs, how to improve its performance and address its limitations, such as potential elite capture, remains understudied. This study aims to test whether and how participatory CBT can improve targeting accuracy and transparency. Specifically, we raise three questions: (i) can participatory targeting that involves potential beneficiary households improve targeting outcomes by reducing targeting errors (exclusion and inclusion errors); (ii) does community participation reduce administrative (or elite) capture in CBT; and (iii) can community participation affect decision-making dynamics within targeting committees? The experiment will be conducted in 181 Ethiopian villages, which will be randomly assigned to one of the three groups: 1) a control group conducting a hypothetical targeting, 2) an incentivized CBT group allocating real cash transfers, and 3) an incentivized and participatory CBT group involving public disclosure and beneficiary review of targeting decisions. Each village’s targeting committee, composed of six local leaders, will implement the CBT exercise. We measure the relative performance of these CBT variants in identifying and serving poor households. The study assesses the impact of participatory CBT on the breadth and depth of social assistance transfers distributed within communities, using extensive and intensive measures of access to the cash transfers as well as associated targeting errors. To uncover decision-making and negotiation dynamics within targeting committees, we elicit both individual and collective decisions of committee members. Findings will help inform the design and delivery of social assistance programs in fragile, low-accountability, and data-scarce settings.
Intervention
The interventions in this study occur at two levels: the community leaders and the community members (potential beneficiary households). We exogenously vary the nature of the transfer (hypothetical versus real) as well as the type of targeting process (without the participation of community members versus with participation of community members). This design allows us to study whether participatory targeting and hence inclusion of potential beneficiaries in targeting processes make CBT more effective in terms of identifying the poor and reducing administrative capture. For this purpose, we design alternative versions of CBT processes, which are described below.
Intervention: ranking and allocation of real versus hypothetical cash transfers by community leaders
We task community leaders to rank about 20 randomly selected households in their respective community from the most to the least needy, based on their need for potential social assistance. We provide community leaders with either a hypothetical or real lump-sum of cash transfers to allocate among the ranked households according to their perceived need for social assistance. The assignment of communities into the hypothetical and incentivized treatment arms is discussed in the experimental design.
Before the ranking and allocation of transfers, we administer a series of questions that aim to elicit community leaders’ objective functions in CBT. Specifically, we elicit community leaders’ priorities in the allocation of constrained budgets across households facing different constraints and challenges.
Each intervention will be implemented during structured field sessions facilitated by trained enumerators in collaboration with local authorities. Targeting committees, composed of six local leaders, will conduct the CBT exercises following standardized instructions provided by the research team. All sessions will be closely monitored to ensure adherence to the experimental protocol and consistency across communities.
The intervention tests whether community participation and real incentives in CBT can improve the accuracy of beneficiary identification. The experimental design isolates the role of incentives (real versus hypothetical transfers) and participation (with versus without public review of targeting decisions) to identify how these factors influence targeting performance.
Experimental design
This section describes the experimental design of the CBT. The target group for this experiment is community leaders drawn from 181 communities. Thus, the key actors and targets of our interventions are the six community leaders recruited from each village. As described earlier, the CBT experiment brings together six community leaders who assume various roles and responsibilities within each village. To mimic actual targeting practices in Ethiopia, we define the six committee members to include: (i) a Kebele leader or member of the kebele leadership, (ii) an elder man/woman, (iii) a religious leader, (iv) a women’s representative, (v) a teacher or development agent or extension worker, and (vi) a youth representative. These members reflects the typical composition of local targeting committees in social protection programs in Ethiopia, including the PSNP. The same community leaders also participated in a similar targeting experiment conducted two years ago (Abay et al., 2024).
The CBT intervention follows community-level clustered randomization, in which the 181 communities are randomly assigned into one of the three treatment arms. The random assignment is stratified by region and by previous treatment status, as many of the community leaders had participated in a prior CBT experiment (Abay et al., 2024). The treatment assignment varies along two dimensions: (i) whether the community receives an actual transfer or a hypothetical transfer (control group), and (ii) whether the community members (potential beneficiary households) participate or not in the targeting process. The treatment arms generated by these combinations are outlined below.
(1) Control: Hypothetical targeting and ranking for distributing a 20,000 Birr transfer (C): Community leaders in this group are instructed to assume a hypothetical budget of 20,000 Birr, which needs to be distributed to those deemed “needy”. Before allocating transfers, community leaders are first asked to rank 20 sample households from the most to the least needy, based on their perceived need for social assistance. They are then asked to allocate this notional budget among the 20 households included in our sample according to their ranking. During this exercise, leaders are required to strictly adhere to pre-defined criteria provided by the research team. These criteria are carefully selected to mirror the targeting criteria used in actual social assistance programs in Ethiopia, such as the PSNP (Gilligan et al., 2009; Berhane et al., 2024). Community leaders are instructed to prioritize households that: (i) had difficulty satisfying their food needs; (ii) own no or little asset (e.g., livestock, land); (iii) have limited income-generating activities or capacity; (iv) have lost productive assets due to shocks (e.g., conflict, drought); and (v) have lost family members recently. These targeting criteria closely follow those used by the national safety net program in Ethiopia, the PSNP (e.g., Gilligan et al., 2009; Hoddinott et al., 2012; Abay et al., 2022).
(2) Incentivized targeting involving actual cash transfer (T1): Another group of communities is randomly assigned to a treatment arm that receives real transfer funds with a total budget of 20,000 Birr (about 140 USD). In this treatment arm, community leaders are required to rank households based on the same five pre-determined targeting criteria in the control group and allocate real cash transfers to those deemed “needy".
(3) Incentivized and participatory targeting involving community members (T2): This group of communities follows similar rules as those in T1, but the targeting process incorporates public engagement by involving potential beneficiary households. Community members (potential beneficiary households) will actively participate in in reviewing and approving the proposed beneficiary list. All decision made by the committee will be publicly disclosed and reviewed by at least two-third of the potential beneficiary households (community members) for final approval and implementation. This includes disclosing the following information to the community members (potential beneficiary households): (i) Total budget allocated, 20,000 Ethiopian Birr, (ii) Amount (and share) of transfer/budget they withhold for administrative costs by community leaders; (iii) A list of potential beneficiaries identified by community leaders, as well as the amount allocated to each beneficiary, and (iv) justification of community leaders’ decision to community members.
Community leaders are asked to rank households from the most needy (1st) to the least needy (last) and propose how funds should be allocated to those households they deem needy, but final allocation requires support by at least half of the community members (households). Most importantly, community members will vote on whether to include or exclude each proposed beneficiary. If a simple majority supports or rejects a decision, the community members' vote overrides the committee’s proposal. This treatment arm allows us to examine whether public disclosure and participation of potential beneficiaries improve targeting accuracy and reduce elite capture.
Design details
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