Price Informativeness, belief updating, and information aggregation
How to cite
Rozzi, Roberto; Giachini, Daniele; Bottazzi, Giulio. 2025. "Price Informativeness, belief updating, and information aggregation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017219. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17219-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This experiment investigates how individuals update beliefs and trade when exposed to aggregate information in the form of consensus price signals. Participants engage in repeated rounds of pairwise trading of a risky asset with uncertain payoffs. Each experimental session, conducted online via oTree with 6–12 participants, is randomly assigned to either a treatment condition—where participants receive a consensus price signal based on previous trading outcomes—or a control condition without such information. The design allows for clean identification of the causal effect of price informativeness on trading behavior and belief formation. Primary outcomes include trading behavior, accuracy, and convergence of beliefs; the secondary outcome measures the influence of the consensus signal on belief updating. The study contributes to understanding how aggregated market information shapes individual decision-making and improves the efficiency of information aggregation in experimental asset markets.
Intervention
This study investigates how individuals update beliefs and engage in trading when presented with varying types of information, with a particular focus on the influence of consensus price signals. Rooted in the tradition of experimental economics and building on the framework of Plott and Sunder (1988), the study introduces novel features such as randomized information treatments and pairwise trading interactions. Participants engage in repeated rounds of simplified trading, where they are required to submit threshold prices reflecting their willingness to buy or sell a risky asset with an unknown payoff. The core objective is to understand how pre-trade information—especially in the form of an aggregated consensus price from previous trading activity—affects individual decision-making and belief formation.
Experimental design
The experiment follows a randomized controlled design with between-subject treatment assignment. Participants engage in repeated rounds of pairwise trading of a risky asset with uncertain payoffs. In each session, individuals are randomly assigned to a treatment group that receives a consensus price signal—computed from prior trading outcomes—or to a control group without such information. This design allows identification of the causal effect of exposure to aggregated price information on trading behavior and belief updating.
Design details
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