Collusion in continuous-time markets
How to cite
Tam, Mia; Bayer, Ralph-C. 2025. "Collusion in continuous-time markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017188. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17188-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This research aims to understand the mechanism behind why cooperation in repeated games is higher in real-time environments. Markets where firms set prices are examples of when this mechanism is relevant, as tacit collusion (collusion without explicit communication) is a form of cooperation. As more markets move online, there is increasing concern this could facilitate firms to tacitly collude. Understandingthe mechanism behind higher levels of cooperation in real-time environments can help to inform competition policy.
Intervention
Laboratory experiments.
Experimental design
Three treatments:
Stochastic
Lockin
Stochastic-lockin
Design details
Cited by
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