Collusion in continuous-time markets

How to cite

Tam, Mia; Bayer, Ralph-C. 2025. "Collusion in continuous-time markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017188. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17188-1.0

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Mia Tam* , Ralph-C Bayer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017188
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17188-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-11-12 – 2026-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D43, C92, L13
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17188

Abstract

This research aims to understand the mechanism behind why cooperation in repeated games is higher in real-time environments. Markets where firms set prices are examples of when this mechanism is relevant, as tacit collusion (collusion without explicit communication) is a form of cooperation. As more markets move online, there is increasing concern this could facilitate firms to tacitly collude. Understandingthe mechanism behind higher levels of cooperation in real-time environments can help to inform competition policy.

Intervention

Laboratory experiments.

Experimental design

Three treatments:
Stochastic
Lockin
Stochastic-lockin

Design details

Randomization method
Participants are invited to sign up to experimental sessions and are not aware of which treatment of the experiment they will participate in.
Randomization unit
Experimental sessions
Clusters
3 treatments. The exact number of sessions for each treatment will depend on the number of participants that sign up and attend each session, but is expected to be 3-4 per treatment. This is 9-12 sessions in total.
Observations
Approx. 20-30 independent observations per treatment. A market, comprising of two participants, is one independent observation. With three treatments, we expect between 60-90 observations
Arms
Three treatments, each with 40-60 participants. Thus, in total between 120-180 participants.
Primary outcomes
Average prices and profits in each market, proportions of markets colluding (or other),

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords