Educational Inequality in the Household
How to cite
Gehrke, Esther; Amador, Michelle González. 2025. "Educational Inequality in the Household." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017183. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17183-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to study the effect of convexities in the returns to education on parental resource allocation between children. Our sample consists of parents with two children simultaneously enrolled in high school in San Luis Potosí, Mexico. Parents are asked to play a high-stakes (educational) resource allocation game, following a cognitive test administered to their children. Across six distinct scenarios, the order of which is randomized at the individual level, we vary the convexity of the payoff function, as well as the degree of complementarity between child performance and parental inputs.
Intervention
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with children and parents to test how parents allocate resources between their children. In an allocation task, parents are given nine tokens which they can allocate between their children. In combination with the children's performance on a Raven's test, these are to determine the payoffs received by each child. These payoffs are non-transferable, and should be highly valued by parents and children. The allocation task is repeated six times. Across these six distinct scenarios, one of which is drawn at random and implemented after the experiment, we vary the relative cost of compensating existing performance differences between the children.
Experimental design
3x2 factorial design that varies across six scenarios (randomly ordered within person) the i. complementarity in child performance and parental investment, and ii. the convexity in the payoff function. We will compare allocations to the high performing child for the three levels of complementarity (low complementarity, medium complementarity, high complementarity) and allocations to the high performing child for the two levels of convexity in payoffs (no convexity, high convexity).
Design details
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