Efficient Private Takings
How to cite
McCabe, Kevin; Mayo, Robert. 2016. "Efficient Private Takings." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001714. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1714-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines the efficiency takings hypothesis in the Law and Economics literature. In our experiment we study how well people can solve this problem naturally using social norms such as trust and reciprocity.
Experimental design
Each experiment subject will be randomly and anonymously paired with another subject. One subject of each pair will be selected at random to be Participant 1; the other will be Participant 2. Subjects will learn whether they are Participant 1 or 2 prior to making any decisions. After assignment, Participant 2 receives $1. Participant 1 can take some or all of the $1 from Participant 2. Before Participant 1 receives this, it will be tripled by the experimenter. Once Participant 1 receives the tripled amount, Participant 2 can decide whether to take back some, all, or none of the tripled amount from the same person who took from them. The amount taken back by Participant 2 is not tripled again. A questionnaire will be given to mechanical turk participants only upon completion of the game or individually to a player who did not finish the game. Attached is the survey the participants will fill out. We are interested in improving the quality and outcome data of the experiment. We would like to understand the etiology of why subjects are not participating in the game. This questionnaire will improve the quality of the experiment, bring in more subjects, and help decrease the amount of “non-participants” through understanding why they are not participating.
Design details
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