Does Democracy Inevitably Lead to Aggressive Redistribution? A Family Perspective

How to cite

Fan, Simon. 2025. "Does Democracy Inevitably Lead to Aggressive Redistribution? A Family Perspective." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017137. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17137-1.0

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Simon Fan*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017137
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17137-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-10-29 – 2026-06-10
Countries
Hong Kong (Hong Kong)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17137

Abstract

This paper explains why democracies marked by inequalities may not experience aggressive redistribution through the lens of parent-child interactions. Parental concerns about the negative impacts of high taxation on their children’s motivation to study and pursue high-paying careers deter the poor majority from harboring an inclination to expropriate the rich. We construct an overlapping generations model in which workers vote on the redistributive policy under majority rule, while considering the incentive costs that the policy imposes on their children. We analyze the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium where the likelihood that a moderate income tax can be credibly enforced increases with the degree of parental altruism. We will test the theoretical implications based on laboratory experiments.

Intervention

We will recruit students of a large Chinese university to participate in laboratory experiments.

Experimental design

There are multiple rounds in the game you are about to play. The system may randomly stop the game at any time. At the beginning of the experiment, 38 participants are randomly divided into two groups: Group A and Group B.

In each round, one group plays the game while the other group observes but does not participate. At the beginning of each round, every member of the group playing the game receives 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which they can choose to either save or invest. The exchange rate is 20 ECU = 1 RMB.

Additionally, participants who choose to invest and become “successful” will receive an extra 400 ECU. The probability of becoming successful increases with the amount invested. Specifically, if a participant invests e, their probability of success is:
0.05√e
If a participant becomes successful, they receive a reward of 400 ECU. If they are not successful, they receive nothing for that investment.
Moreover — and perhaps more importantly — participants also receive a reward based on the number of successful players in the next round.
Each round of the game consists of five stages, which occur in sequence.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done in office by a computer. In the simplest experimental design, there are multiple rounds in the game you are about to play. The system may randomly stop the game at any time. At the beginning of the experiment, 38 participants are randomly divided into two groups: Group A and Group B. In a more refined experimental design, we will recruit 45 students in each experimental group. There will be multiple rounds in the game you are about to play. The system may randomly stop the game at any time. At the beginning of the experiment, 45 participants are randomly divided into three groups: Group A, Group B and Group C. Then, the system will randomly re-divide the 45 students in three new groups after every 3 rounds of experiments.
Randomization unit
Both (or three) groups and individuals.
Clusters
400
Observations
1000
Arms
1000
Primary outcomes
The primary focus of the experiments is to test whether, and how, one group (referred to as Group A) honoring its original agreement affects the behavior of the other group (referred to as Group B). If Group B’s actions impact Group A’s material benefits, then all members of Group A may choose to honor their original agreement (or deviate less from it) in order to induce Group B to take actions that benefit Group A. Most interestingly, this inducement for all members of Group A to honor their original agreement may encourage them to make high investments without worrying that their group mates will take their returns when they are successful, which ultimately leads to a significant increase in the welfare of all members of Group A.

Cited by

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Keywords