Does Democracy Inevitably Lead to Aggressive Redistribution? A Family Perspective
How to cite
Fan, Simon. 2025. "Does Democracy Inevitably Lead to Aggressive Redistribution? A Family Perspective." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017137. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17137-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This paper explains why democracies marked by inequalities may not experience aggressive redistribution through the lens of parent-child interactions. Parental concerns about the negative impacts of high taxation on their children’s motivation to study and pursue high-paying careers deter the poor majority from harboring an inclination to expropriate the rich. We construct an overlapping generations model in which workers vote on the redistributive policy under majority rule, while considering the incentive costs that the policy imposes on their children. We analyze the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium where the likelihood that a moderate income tax can be credibly enforced increases with the degree of parental altruism. We will test the theoretical implications based on laboratory experiments.
Intervention
We will recruit students of a large Chinese university to participate in laboratory experiments.
Experimental design
There are multiple rounds in the game you are about to play. The system may randomly stop the game at any time. At the beginning of the experiment, 38 participants are randomly divided into two groups: Group A and Group B.
In each round, one group plays the game while the other group observes but does not participate. At the beginning of each round, every member of the group playing the game receives 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which they can choose to either save or invest. The exchange rate is 20 ECU = 1 RMB.
Additionally, participants who choose to invest and become “successful” will receive an extra 400 ECU. The probability of becoming successful increases with the amount invested. Specifically, if a participant invests e, their probability of success is:
0.05√e
If a participant becomes successful, they receive a reward of 400 ECU. If they are not successful, they receive nothing for that investment.
Moreover — and perhaps more importantly — participants also receive a reward based on the number of successful players in the next round.
Each round of the game consists of five stages, which occur in sequence.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.