Narrative Willingness to Pay
How to cite
Albertazzi, Andrea; Stringhi, Alessandro; Stimolo, Marco; Pin, Paolo. 2025. "Narrative Willingness to Pay." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017081. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17081-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study extends another ongoing project pre-registered here: https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.15672-1.0
We build on the framework of the existing project with the aim of exploring how narratives affect the monetary value people attach to nondiagnostic information.
We will replicate a similar Bayesian problem in a controlled experiment, where individuals face uncertainty and use new information to update their beliefs about the true state of the world. New information does not come for free, but signals can be purchased by the participant before stating their belief.
We will randomly assign participants to one of four conditions:
1) C_No_Info: participants engage with an abstract inference problem where acquired signals can only be diagnostic or missing.
2) C_Yes_Info: participants engage with an abstract inference problem where acquired signals can be diagnostic and nondiagnostic.
In the remaining treatments, participants will instead receive a fictional story, framed around identifying a culprit, which mirrors the same uncertainty and signals as the baseline but embeds them in a more emotionally and contextually rich framework.
3) N_No_Info: participants engage with the story, and acquired signals can only be diagnostic or missing.
4) N_Yes_Info: participants engage with the story, and acquired signals can be diagnostic and nondiagnostic.
By comparing differences across treatments, we assess whether the presence of a narrative increases the monetary value participants assign to nondiagnostic information. We expect higher valuations because, in our previous experiment, participants used nondiagnostic information to update their beliefs. Our goal is to show that subjects not only (mis)use nondiagnostic signals but also regard them as informative.
Intervention
We will vary two treatment variables in a 2×2 between-subjects design:
1) Type of context: participants are exposed to either an abstract or a narrative (fictional) story.
2) Signal technology: nondiagnostic signals are either present or absent (i.e., participants see a blank line instead of the nondiagnostic signal).
Experimental design
In all treatments, participants first read an initial ‘story’. In C_No_Info and C_Yes_Info, the story is presented in an abstract inference frame; in N_No_Info and N_Yes_Info, it is framed as a narrative. All stories, regardless of treatment, involve two mutually exclusive alternatives.
Participants state a prior belief about which alternative is correct.
Next, for each story they play 5 rounds in which they state the price at which they are willing to purchase three new signals. Prices are elicited with an incentivised Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism. Depending on treatment, signals can favour one of the two alternatives or be nondiagnostic/missing (i.e., no signal is shown). The ex-ante probabilities of each signal are common knowledge. After each BDM elicitation, participants report a posterior belief.
Each participant completes three different stories (15 rounds in total). Participants are paid for each belief elicitation.
Design details
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