Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the Supply Chain: Agroforestry with Coffee Farmers in Rwanda
How to cite
Steenkamp, Iris; Macchiavello, Rocco. 2025. "Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the Supply Chain: Agroforestry with Coffee Farmers in Rwanda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017077. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17077-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Reducing global poverty and mitigating climate change are among the most pressing global policy issues. At the same time, many of the costs of climate change are expected to fall on some of the world's poorest, including farmers in tropical areas. Payment-for-ecosystem-services (PES) have emerged as a potential "win-win" solution that simultaneously addresses both poverty (by providing an additional source of income) and supports conservation efforts.
We partner with a multi-national coffee buyer to provide and evaluate the impact of differential financial incentive schemes on planting and survival of shade trees by coffee farmers in the buyer’s supply chain in Rwanda. We experimentally test the effectiveness of incentivising based on planting (standard PES) and based on survival and delivery to the buyer. Additionally, we explore various methods to reduce plot verification cost – a key bottleneck in scaling agroforestry within supply chains – by utilizing call center interactions to uncover intentional misreporting by farmers. We will generate evidence on how to implement agroforestry programs within supply chains in a cost-effective and scalable manner.
Intervention
In partnership with a multinational coffee buyer, we design, implement, and evaluate the impact of financial incentive schemes on smallholders’ planting and survival of shade trees within the Rwanda coffee supply chain.
First, we examine the take-up and impact of different financial incentive schemes on planting and survival of shade trees. In both schemes, farmers earn incentives based on the number of trees planted and/or surviving. In Treatment 1, incentives are paid based on number of shade trees planted. In Treatment 2, farmers are eligible a smaller planting incentive and for a second incentives conditional on shade tree survival, and delivery to the Partner. Additionally, within treatment 2, we cross-randomize whether farmers receive a booklet to track their progress within the agroforestry program.
Second, we randomize information provided to farmers about the process of receiving payment and/or verification based on planting. We measure the impact on likelihood of call center engagement and planting.
Third, we cross-randomize low-cost verification approaches—leveraging call-center follow-ups to detect misreporting—to reduce plot verification costs, a key bottleneck to scaling agroforestry.
We roll out the intervention across five coffee washing stations (CWS) in Rwanda. The study builds on earlier collaborations in this supply chain and will generate practical guidance on implementing agroforestry programs that are credible, cost-effective, and scalable.
Experimental design
In this study, we examine the impact of cash-based incentives for the planting and/or survival of shade trees on their take-up. Second, we examine the impact of information provided to farmers about the process of receiving payment and/or verification on actions taken within the program. Third, we explore the impact of low-cost verification approaches to reduce plot verification costs.
Our empirical strategy focuses on the following elements: i) the (differential) impact of agroforestry incentive schemes on planting and survival of shade trees, ii) the impact of information regarding steps to request payment/verification on the likelihood to call the call center and the planting of shade trees, and iii) low-cost verification approaches that detect misreporting to reduce plot verification costs, and to what extent both misreporting is detected.
Random assignment for financial incentives was conducted at the individual-level, at different intensities at the village level, stratified by village, gender, farm size, and participation in the stumping experiment. Importantly, a farmer’s random assignment was only revealed to them after they had arrived at the distribution site, completed agroforestry training, and expressed interest in collecting free shade trees.
Additionally, for the request intervention, Randomization is stratified at the level of Site/CWS x Day x Time of Day. For the counter-offer intervention, we stratify random assignment by CWS x Gender × Farm Size × Participation in Stumping in 2024 x Request Calling Status (1/0) x Type of Request (Payment/Verification).
Design details
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