Loss Aversion and Agricultural Investment: Experimental Evidence from Smallholder Farmers in Kenya
How to cite
Levine, Madison; Janzen, Sarah; Kramer, Berber; Shikuku, Kelvin. 2025. "Loss Aversion and Agricultural Investment: Experimental Evidence from Smallholder Farmers in Kenya." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017074. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17074-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study examines how loss aversion influences smallholder farmers' investment decisions in the presence of innovative tools such as loans, index insurance, and emergency credit. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment with 210 farmers in two of Kenya’s semi-arid counties, we investigate how behavioral biases influence investment in productivity-enhancing inputs with and without the availability of risk-mitigating products. We hypothesize that farmers perceive upfront costs as certain losses, discouraging adoption even when long-term benefits outweigh costs. Additionally, we assess whether emergency credit, which removes upfront payment requirements, mitigates this reluctance and encourages investment. Participants engage in experimental games under risk and uncertainty, and make repeated agricultural investment choices across varying financial and climatic conditions. We also elicit behavioral parameters of risk aversion, loss aversion, and inverse probability weighting. This approach allows us to observe how different innovative tools and preferences influence decision-making.
Intervention
The intervention consists of a lab-in-the-field experiment designed to study how behavioral preferences, particularly loss aversion, shape smallholder farmers’ agricultural investment decisions under risk.
Participants play two digital, incentive-compatible games:
1. Financial Investment Game (FIG) – a multi-round simulation that mimics real-world farming. Farmers decide how much to invest in fertilizer and whether to adopt three risk-management tools: drought-tolerant (DT) seeds, index insurance, and emergency credit (EC). Early rounds offer these tools for free; later rounds use a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) auction to elicit willingness-to-pay.
2. Multiple Price Listing (MPL) Risk and Loss Aversion Game – a series of incentivized lotteries used to estimate each farmer’s risk- and loss-aversion parameters recovered through maximum likelihood estimations.
The intervention combines experimental exposure to financial tools with elicitation of behavioral parameters in a controlled but realistic environment.
Experimental design
This lab-in-the-field experiment examines how exposure to different risk-management tools affects farmers’ fertilizer investment decisions and how these effects interact with individual loss aversion. Each participant plays both the Financial Investment Game and the MPL lotteries task in a tablet-based setting. Modules introducing DT seeds, insurance, and EC are randomly ordered within sessions to prevent learning biases. Each session includes 12–16 farmers across 17 villages drawn from Machakos and Makueni counties in Kenya.
Design details
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