Political Collusion and Civic Resistance to Organized Crime
How to cite
Pulejo, Massimo. 2025. "Political Collusion and Civic Resistance to Organized Crime." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017044. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17044-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Eradicating organized criminal groups requires the efforts of both the state and ordinary citizens. But how do citizens react to collusion between public officials and criminal organizations? To answer this question, I run a survey experiment in which a randomly selected subset of respondents are provided with a prime about political collusion, while a second subset are given official information about the prevalence of collusion among Italian public officials. A third subset receives neither the priming nor the information. I then evaluate the effects of these two treatments on both behavioral and attitudinal outcomes, aimed at understanding how the treatments affect respondents' evaluation of the state and of civil society associations when it comes to fighting against organized criminal groups.
Intervention
The intervention takes place in the context of an online questionnaire delivered by a professional panel provider. A randomly selected subset of respondents are provided with a prime about political collusion, while a second subset are given official information about the prevalence of collusion among Italian public officials. A third subset receives neither the priming nor the information.
Experimental design
The survey flow consists of the following:
- Informed consent to the participation and disclaimers in accordance with the GDPR regulations and requirements of the Research Ethics Committee of Bocconi University.
- Screening demographic questions ensuring representativity of the sample.
- Questions on social and political attitudes at baseline, ensuring representativity of the sample and to be used for heterogeneity and robustness checks.
- Experimental condition delivery. Each subject is randomized into one of three experimental conditions exposing them to (see above for details about what each treatment condition entails):
I. Collusion Priming (T1).
II. Collusion Priming + Information (T2).
III. Control (T0): Baseline condition providing no priming and no information.
- Behavioral outcome elicitation of revealed preference for support to governmental (ISPRA) or non-governmental (Legambiente and Libera) organizations in the form of donation of experimental (windfall) money.
- Outcome elicitation of trust in eight institutions (European Union, Italian government, Italian parliament, Italian President of the Republic, Italian judiciary, Italian law enforcement agencies, regional administrations and municipal administrations).
- Outcome elicitation of three most important issues, to be chosen from a list of six options (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, fiscal evasion).
- Outcome elicitation of public officials’ and civil society organizations’ perceived efficacy in addressing three issues (environmental pollution, mafias and economic inequality).
- Outcome elicitation of voting intentions in the next general election and in the next municipal election.
- Delivery of T2 treatment condition to check for immediate recall ability (T0 only).
- Question asking to recall the information provided from the ANAC report (T0 and T2 only).
Design details
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