Political Collusion and Civic Resistance to Organized Crime

How to cite

Pulejo, Massimo. 2025. "Political Collusion and Civic Resistance to Organized Crime." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017044. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17044-1.0

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Massimo Pulejo*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017044
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17044-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-10-17 – 2025-11-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17044

Abstract

Eradicating organized criminal groups requires the efforts of both the state and ordinary citizens. But how do citizens react to collusion between public officials and criminal organizations? To answer this question, I run a survey experiment in which a randomly selected subset of respondents are provided with a prime about political collusion, while a second subset are given official information about the prevalence of collusion among Italian public officials. A third subset receives neither the priming nor the information. I then evaluate the effects of these two treatments on both behavioral and attitudinal outcomes, aimed at understanding how the treatments affect respondents' evaluation of the state and of civil society associations when it comes to fighting against organized criminal groups.

Intervention

The intervention takes place in the context of an online questionnaire delivered by a professional panel provider. A randomly selected subset of respondents are provided with a prime about political collusion, while a second subset are given official information about the prevalence of collusion among Italian public officials. A third subset receives neither the priming nor the information.

Experimental design

The survey flow consists of the following:

- Informed consent to the participation and disclaimers in accordance with the GDPR regulations and requirements of the Research Ethics Committee of Bocconi University.

- Screening demographic questions ensuring representativity of the sample.

- Questions on social and political attitudes at baseline, ensuring representativity of the sample and to be used for heterogeneity and robustness checks.

- Experimental condition delivery. Each subject is randomized into one of three experimental conditions exposing them to (see above for details about what each treatment condition entails):
I. Collusion Priming (T1).
II. Collusion Priming + Information (T2).
III. Control (T0): Baseline condition providing no priming and no information.

- Behavioral outcome elicitation of revealed preference for support to governmental (ISPRA) or non-governmental (Legambiente and Libera) organizations in the form of donation of experimental (windfall) money.

- Outcome elicitation of trust in eight institutions (European Union, Italian government, Italian parliament, Italian President of the Republic, Italian judiciary, Italian law enforcement agencies, regional administrations and municipal administrations).

- Outcome elicitation of three most important issues, to be chosen from a list of six options (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, fiscal evasion).

- Outcome elicitation of public officials’ and civil society organizations’ perceived efficacy in addressing three issues (environmental pollution, mafias and economic inequality).

- Outcome elicitation of voting intentions in the next general election and in the next municipal election.

- Delivery of T2 treatment condition to check for immediate recall ability (T0 only).

- Question asking to recall the information provided from the ANAC report (T0 and T2 only).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization by computer carried out by the panel provider company at the beginning of the interview.
Randomization unit
Individual. Each group has quotas to ensure representativeness of the Italian population by age, gender, and geographic location.
Clusters
N.A.
Observations
8,000 respondents.
Arms
N.A.
Primary outcomes
1) Behavioral outcomes: • Donation to public or private organizations (ISPRA vs. Libera/Legambiente) and to organizations devoted to fighting OCGs vs. protecting the environment (Libera vs. ISPRA/Legambiente). 2) Attitudinal outcomes: • Trust in institutions. • Concerns about selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion) • Perceived efficacy of public officials in solving selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion). • Perceived efficacy of civil society organizations in solving selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion). • Voting intentions.

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Keywords