Scaling and Equity Auctions: The Types-as-Quantities Case
How to cite
Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Novoa, Diego Carrasco; Mora, Ernesto Rivera. 2025. "Scaling and Equity Auctions: The Types-as-Quantities Case." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017041. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17041-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates behavior in experimental procurement auctions for the completion of projects. Projects require inputs, and these requirements are stochastic. Bidders' types be associated with shifts in the distribution of required inputs. Participants will be organized in groups of two and will participate in both equity and scaling auctions.
Experimental design
This study compares two procurement auction formats, scaling (unit-price) and equity-bid auctions, under uncertainty about input quantities. In each round, participants bid for the right to complete a project that requires two costly inputs and a fixed setup cost. In the scaling treatment, bidders specify per-unit prices for each input, and the bidder with the lowest weighted score wins. In the equity treatment, bidders request a percentage reimbursement of their variable costs, and the lowest requested share wins. After winning, payoffs depend on realized input quantities, which vary randomly to capture cost uncertainty. The design allows us to compare how the two mechanisms allocate risk and select efficient providers when project requirements are uncertain.
Design details
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