Tax Compliance and Social Network

How to cite

Chen, Jingnan (Cecilia); Dai, Zhixin; Chen, Yixin; Wei, Tianqi; Yang, Su. 2025. "Tax Compliance and Social Network." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017009. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17009-1.0

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Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen* , Zhixin Dai , Yixin Chen , Tianqi Wei , Su Yang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017009
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17009-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-11-13 – 2027-01-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H26
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17009

Abstract

Traditional models of tax compliance typically frame the decision as an individual cost-benefit calculation based on an exogenous, objective audit probability. In reality, however taxpayers operate under substantial uncertainty and their compliance decisions are influenced by subjective beliefs about audit risk. Previous studies have shown that individuals actively seek information on the tax affairs of others within their social networks.The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. However, it remains unclear how social network comparatively shape belief formation and compliance behaviour.

We aim to study how different social network structures influence tax compliance behaviour by shaping their beliefs about audit probability, and how these effects vary with objective audit probability. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions: a Control group (no social information), a Chain Network (are informed audit information of direct neighbours), or a Complete Network (are informed audit information of all group members). All participants will complete multiple rounds of a tax compliance game under two different, fixed audit probabilities. We will measure their compliance decisions and beliefs about the audit probability each round.

Intervention

We implement a between-subjects design with three treatments: Control, Chain Network, and Complete Network. Each participant is assigned to one treatment and remains in it throughout both parts of the experiment.

Experimental design

This study consists of two main parts (Part A and Part B) followed by a survey. In both parts, participants will be randomly assigned to a group of four and will complete 10 rounds of a tax compliance game under a fixed but unknown audit probability. The information they receive about their group members depends on their treatment assignment. The only systematic variation between Part A and Part B is the level of the (unannounced) audit probability.
The experimental treatment differs only in the social network structure that connects the members within each group. We implement a between-subjects design with three treatments: Control, Chain Network, and Complete Network. Each participant is assigned to one treatment and remains in it throughout both parts of the experiment.

While both network treatments provide social information about audit information, the key distinction is the scope of this information: the Chain Network provides localised information about direct neighbours, whereas the Complete Network provides global information about all group members.

In all network treatments and at the beginning of each round, participants are randomly matched into new groups of four and assigned a new position within their group’s network. Participants are first shown their network position and the previous round’s audit information of their observable neighbours; they then receive a random income and decide how much of it to declare for taxation, with a tax rate of 25% applied to the declared income and a fine of 100% of the evaded tax imposed if audited and found non-compliant; subsequently, they report their beliefs about the current audit probability by allocating 100 tokens across ten probability intervals using an incentive-compatible Quadratic Scoring Rule; finally, they are informed of their own audit result and their after-tax income for the round. Following each of the experimental part, participants will complete a scenario-based assessment designed to measure their perceptions of the appropriateness of different tax compliance decisions.

After the experimental tasks, participants will be invited to complete a comprehensive questionnaire that collects demographic information, behavioural preferences, and their perceptions of the experiment.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer-based randomisation in controlled laboratory setting.
Randomization unit
1. Session-level randomization: Experimental sessions are randomly assigned to treatment conditions (Control, Chain, Complete) by using a constrained randomisation procedure. 2. Block-level randomization: the ordinal high audit rate and low audit rate are randomly assigned between two parts. 3. Individual-level randomization: Participants are randomly assigned to network positions within a group of four under the compete and chain treatments, or randomly assigned to a group of four without information about their network positions under the control condition.
Clusters
We plan to recruit 540 participants in total.
Observations
Each subject will make 20 decisions, yielding 20*540=10800 observations.
Arms
We expect 180 participants in the Control treatment, 180 participants in the Chain Network treatment, and 180 participants in the Complete Network treatment.
Primary outcomes
Tax Compliance Rate

Cited by

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Keywords