How excuse-driven risk behavior affects cooperation: Evidence from dictator games and public good games

How to cite

DONG, Wanxin; Zheng, Jiakun; Gong, Yazhen. 2025. "How excuse-driven risk behavior affects cooperation: Evidence from dictator games and public good games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0017001. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17001-1.0

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Wanxin DONG* , Jiakun Zheng , Yazhen Gong

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0017001
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17001-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-10-22 – 2026-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D71, D80, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/17001

Abstract

This study aims to test whether individuals who exhibit excuse-driven risk behavior in the dictator games reduce their cooperation in public goods games, and how their predictions of others’ behavior affect their decision-making in strategic games. Building upon the work of Cardenas et al. (2024) and Dong and Zheng (2025), we conduct a within-subject laboratory experiment in which participants make some decisions in dictator games and public goods games. The dictator games and public goods games are presented in random order at the individual level. The dictator games consist of two tasks: a decision task and a prediction task. The decision task aims to elicit participants’ excuse-driven risk behavior, while the prediction task focuses on their predictions of others' behavior under the same risk scenarios. The public good games, framed as an irrigation provision problem, contain five different modified games. Participants choose between keeping one token with some private returns or investing it in a group fund with some collective returns. Except for the baseline scenario (G0), the rest of the four games present varying degrees of risk to private and collective returns. Specifically, we also conduct a between-subjects design with two treatments: a control group without partial insurance and a treatment group with partial insurance to investigate the impact of expression on the robustness of the results.

Experimental design

The experiment is a within-subject design with two games: dictator games and public goods games. The dictator games and public goods games are presented in random order at the individual level.
The dictator games consist of two tasks: a decision task and a prediction task. The decision task will elicit subjects' excuse-driven risk behavior, while the prediction task will evaluate their predictions of others' excuse-driven behavior under the same risk scenarios. To control for possible ordering effects, we will randomize the order of the decision and prediction tasks at the individual level. In each task, subjects are presented with the same five sets of multiple price lists, comprising a normalization price list and four valuation price lists. Except for the normalization price list, the rest of four price lists will be presented in a random order for each subject.
The public good games, framed as an irrigation provision problem, contain five different games. Subjects in the same experimental session participate in all five games. The experiment always begins with the baseline scenario (G0) in which each subject must choose between keeping one token with some private returns or investing it in a group fund with some collective returns to each participant for each token invested by the group. The rest of four games present varying degrees of risk to private and collective returns. Here, we conduct a between-subjects design with two treatments: a control group without partial insurance and a treatment group with partial insurance. In the control group, subjects face private investment alone (G1), private investment with a reduced risk (G3), public investment alone (G2), and public investment with a reduced risk (G4). In the treatment group, the private-risk game (G1) and the collective-risk game (G2) are the same as those in the control group. Instead, games of G3 and G4 are changed to private investment alongside a partial insurance option (G3’) and public investment alongside a partial insurance option (G4’). To control for possible ordering effects, we randomize the order of the five different games. With the purpose of reducing subjects’ cognitive load and subsequent noisy responses and maintaining task consistency, the experiment always starts with G0, then G1 or G2, and then G3 or G4 (G3’ or G4’).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual. The computer will generate a random order of experimental parts and a random order of decisions within each part for all subjects independently.
Clusters
240 full-time students from Renmin University of China
Observations
240 full-time students from Renmin University of China
Arms
120 full-time students for the control group and 120 full-time students for the treatment group.
Primary outcomes
Excuse-driven risk behavior of each participant; Participants' predictions of others’ excuse-driven risk behavior; The cooperation rate; Identification variable: “excuse” for 1 and “no excuse” for 0; Identification variable: “can predict” for 1 and “fail to predict” for 0; Identification variable: “contribute” for 1 and “keep” for 0.

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Keywords