Local Political Pressure and Bankers' Discretion

How to cite

Wu, Sirui; Jin, Qinglu; Lin, Yupeng. 2025. "Local Political Pressure and Bankers' Discretion." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016979. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16979-1.0

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Sirui Wu* , Qinglu Jin , Yupeng Lin

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016979
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16979-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-08-02 – 2025-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16979

Abstract

This study investigates how local political priorities influence the professional judgment of commercial bank personnel in credit allocation and loan loss provisioning. We conduct a randomized survey experiment among mid- and senior-level managers from several Chinese commercial banks. By comparing decision outcomes between the treatment and control groups, we aim to identify whether subtle political cues shift loan approval patterns, and loss recognition timing. In addition, we explore the heterogenous effects between regional and national banks. This experiment contributes to understanding how informal political pressures shape financial decision-making and risk assessment within state-influenced banking systems.

Experimental design

The experiment followed a two-phase design. In Phase 1, all respondents read two loan scenarios. Scenario (iii) is randomly assigned only to the treatment group. They are provided with additional passage summarizing a local government meeting, which conveyed explicit “window guidance” emphasizing the political imperative of supporting key firms and infrastructure projects, and referenced provisioning flexibility. The control group received no such information.

In Phase 2, respondents completed the following decision tasks: (i) loan approval (stricter approval, conditional approval, normal approval, or priority fast-tracking); (ii) loan loss provisioning (timing of expected loss recognition: early, immediate, or delayed); (iii) heterogeneous responses for different types of banks (centralized HQ-led approval vs. decentralized branch discretion).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is conducted using a coin-toss procedure in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
The randomization is conducted at the individual level.
Clusters
Approximately 300 individual bank practitioners.
Observations
Approximately 300 individual-level observations (primary analysis unit).
Arms
Two-arm design at the individual level: Control group (no political guidance message): ~150 respondents Treatment group (exposed to political guidance message): ~150 respondents
Primary outcomes
(i) Loan approval. (ii) Loan loss provisioning. (iii) Bank heterogeneity.

Cited by

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Keywords