Security Design and Bargaining under Asymmetric Information

How to cite

Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Zhang, Jingjing. 2025. "Security Design and Bargaining under Asymmetric Information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016978. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16978-1.0

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Zachary Breig* , Allan Hernandez-Chanto , Jingjing Zhang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016978
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16978-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-10-16 – 2025-10-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D82, G32, C92
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16978

Abstract

This study investigates bargaining behavior when agreements can be contingent and the market exhibits asymmetric information. Subjects will participate in laboratory sessions in groups of 2, completing 20 rounds of an ultimatum offer game. Offers define a split of each of four different revenue levels, and both parties must pay a cost if the offer is accepted. The side of the market making an offer is better informed about the likelihood of different levels of revenue. We use between-subject treatments that vary the distribution and signal structures subjects face.

Experimental design

Subjects will participate in ultimatum bargaining games under incomplete and asymmetric information.

Design details

Randomization method
The experimental software will randomize automatically. Groups and signals are re-randomized each round.
Randomization unit
Randomization of groups and signals will occur in each round. Randomization to signal structure will occur at the beginning of the experiment.
Clusters
Our final sample size is expected to be 190-210 subjects.
Observations
With 200 subjects participating in 20 rounds (half in each role), the total number of observations of pairs is expected to be 2000.
Arms
We expect to have 50 subjects in each treatment cell.
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcome variables are the offers that senders make and the acceptance decisions that receivers make.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords