Security Design and Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
How to cite
Breig, Zachary; Hernandez-Chanto, Allan; Zhang, Jingjing. 2025. "Security Design and Bargaining under Asymmetric Information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016978. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16978-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study investigates bargaining behavior when agreements can be contingent and the market exhibits asymmetric information. Subjects will participate in laboratory sessions in groups of 2, completing 20 rounds of an ultimatum offer game. Offers define a split of each of four different revenue levels, and both parties must pay a cost if the offer is accepted. The side of the market making an offer is better informed about the likelihood of different levels of revenue. We use between-subject treatments that vary the distribution and signal structures subjects face.
Experimental design
Subjects will participate in ultimatum bargaining games under incomplete and asymmetric information.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.