Threshold Voting Mechanism

How to cite

Bursztyn, Leonardo; Braghieri, Luca. 2025. "Threshold Voting Mechanism." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016968. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16968-1.0

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Leonardo Bursztyn* , Luca Braghieri

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016968
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16968-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2025-05-30 – 2026-02-28
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16968

Abstract

This randomized online experiment tests a threshold voting mechanism that aims to balance privacy and information revelation in collective decision-making. Public voting fosters coordination and accountability but risks conformity through social image concerns. Private voting protects truthful expression but obscures the distribution of preferences. Standard voting systems thus force a stark trade-off: truthful voting at the expense of accountability, or full accountability at the expense of truthful expression. We study an intermediate institution, the threshold voting mechanism. Individuals first cast their vote anonymously, then choose a personal threshold: their vote is revealed publicly only if the number of others voting the same way reaches or exceeds that threshold. UC Berkeley students enrolled in Fall 2025 are randomly assigned to private, public, or threshold voting conditions on a contentious policy proposal. This design allows us to measure the distortions created by public voting and whether the threshold mechanism reduces those distortions while preserving information about underlying preferences.

Experimental design

UC Berkeley students are randomly assigned to one of three voting conditions and asked to vote on a policy proposal.
1. Public Treatment: Vote and name shared with other participants.
2. Private Treatment: Vote is anonymous and not revealed to other participants.
3. Threshold Treatment: Conditional vote revelation based on participant-chosen thresholds.
See attached pre-analysis plan for details.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by survey software (Qualtrics)
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
N/A; 1200 inviduals
Observations
1200 individuals
Arms
Approximately 400 participants per treatment arm (1200 total across three arms: Public, Private, and Threshold treatments).
Primary outcomes
1. Abstention rates across treatment conditions 2. Expression of non-socially desirable views: the share of participants who do not abstain and vote for the non-socially desirable position

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Keywords