Auctions vs. Negotiations with Cash and Equity

How to cite

Rud, Olga; Rabanal, Jean Paul; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel. 2025. "Auctions vs. Negotiations with Cash and Equity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0016957. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16957-1.0

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Olga Rud* , Jean Paul Rabanal , Tom-Reiel Heggedal

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0016957
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16957-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2025-10-08 – 2026-02-28
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C70, C90, D44, D47, G34
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/16957

Abstract

We propose to study how contingent payment options affect the optimal selection of market formats using experimental methods. Our findings can have important implications for how payments are structured in cases such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A), sale of patents, or human capital allocation. Our experimental design focuses on outcomes under two distinct, and widely used formats: (i) a decentralized format, where the seller negotiates directly with a buyer, and (ii) a centralized format, where buyers compete in an auction for an asset. An experiment can clarify whether payment structure has implications for the preferred market format, and identify factors which affect these preferences.

Experimental design

This is a between subject, 2x2 design. The first level pertains to payment structure (contingent or fixed), while the second level pertains to market format (negotiation or auction).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by the program (role of the participant, and matching). Subjects are sorted into treatments randomly at session level.
Randomization unit
Randomization unit is at the experimental session level.
Clusters
About 200 subjects
Observations
Around 25 observations for bilateral treatments (2 of each) and 20 for auctions (2 of each). The bilateral market is composed of 1 seller and 1 buyer, while an auction has 1 seller and 2 buyers.
Arms
We aim to have around 200 subjects, across 4 treatments. In bilateral markets the number of subjects will be 40 to 50 per treatment (based on 8 - 10 subjects per session) and in auctions it will be 45 to 60 (based on 9 to 12 subjects per session). We plan to drop the first 10 rounds of each session and focus our analyses on the remaining 20 rounds due to learning.
Primary outcomes
We are interested in studying contract prices under (i) negotiations and (ii) auctions relative to theoretical predictions. The contracts can be outcome contingent or fixed, depending on the treatments. We are also interested in measuring seller/buyer revenue, volume of contracts in each setting, market efficiency. Our main hypotheses, based on theoretical predictions are: H1: The seller's revenue under equity-auctions is larger than under cash-auctions. H2: The seller's revenue under equity-negotiations is larger than under cash-negotiations. H3: The seller's revenue under cash-auctions is larger than under cash-negotiations. H4: The seller's revenue under equity-auctions is larger than under equity-negotiations. H5: The seller's revenue under negotiations-equity is larger than or equal to under cash-auctions.

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Keywords